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Executive Summary

O

ne of the most important engines driving global economic development
and progress in recent years is the freedom to engage in seaborne trade
throughout the world. Relatively unhindered access to the world's ports is a vitally
important component of the recent story of global economic success. At the same
time. the grave threats that internat ional terrorists and rogue States pose to global
order give rise to overriding maritime security concerns among port States, factors
which argue strongly against a maritime open-door policy. Other vital concerns,
including illegal immigration, drug trafficking, unsafe oil tankers, illegal fishing
and other threats to the marine environment, and violation of customs and trade
laws, are also prompting port States to take actions that im pose conditions on port
entry, to exercise greater jurisdiction in port and even to restr ict traditional freedoms of navigation in coastal waters.
As a general rule, international law preswnes that the ports of every State should
be open to all com mercial vessels. However, if a State considers that one or more
important interests require closure, necessitate imposing conditions on entry or
exit, or dictate the exercise of greater jurisdiction over fo reign vessels in port,
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Conditions on Entry of Foreign-Flag Vessels into US Ports
international law generally pennits the port State to do so. A port State may restrict
the port entry of all foreign vessels, subject only to any rights of entry clearly
granted under an applicable treaty and those vessels in distress due to force majeure.
At the same time, international law presumes that the port State will restrict access
to foreign commercial vessels or impose sanctions upon those that enter port, even
those designed to promote important maritime goals, which are reasonably related
to ensuring the safe, secure and appropriate entry or departure of the vessel on the
occasion in question.
As a fundamental policy goal, all States must cooperate to develop and implement efficient and effective conditions on port entry to ensure the security of the
port State and the international commercial system. Unreasonably restrictive conditions would have a deleterious effect on global trade and the world's economy.
Ineffective conditions on entry, such as faulty procedures to screen ships and their
cargoes, could result in a security breakdown and a devastating terrorist attack on a
port city. Such a disaster would render virtually inconsequential the debate over restrictions on port entry to achieve political, environmental, navigational safety, law
enforcement or other worthwhile goals. Even so, international lawyers and policymakers in the United States and elsewhere m ust seek to ensure that access to the
ports of the world is fundamentally free, and restricted only on conditions directly,
effectively and reasonably related to the significant interests of the port State and
the world community at large.
This article discusses general principles of international and domestic law governing the condition of port entry as a basis for regulating foreign vessels entering
ports, with an emphasis on maritime security. It also considers the policy consequences of imposing legally permissible restrictions or requirements that could
have the practical effect of infringing unreasonably on maritime commerce, or
which would lead to concerns in the international community and which might result in diplomatic protests and political objections. The goal of the article is to develop an analytical structure that would encourage a rational review of any
proposed conditions on entry to ports to help ensure that any such requirements
are legal, acceptable, reasonable and wise. In a post-9f t ! world that remains dependent on international trade for economic prosperity, achieving an effective,
balanced, legal and workable port-entry regime is a vitally important goal.
1. Introdu ction and Competing Policy Interests

As a general rule, international law presumes that the ports of every State should be
open to all commercial vessels seeking to call on them. As Professors McDougal
and Burke observed forty-five years ago: "The chieffunction of ports for the coastal
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state is in provision of cheap and easy access to the oceans and to the rest of the
world .... [T]he availability of good harbors ... remains a priceless national asset."1
Every modern State has a general obligation to engage in commercial intercourse
with other States and, absent an important reason, none should deny foreign commercial vessels reciprocal access to its ports. 2
In a much-quoted (yet often-criticized) statement, an arbitral tribunal observed
in the Aramco case in 1958, "According to a great principle of public international
law, the ports of every State must be open to foreign merchant vessels and can only
be dosed when the vital interests of the State so require.») In his widely respected
treatise, Dr. c.J. Colombos wrote that "in time of peace, commercial ports must be
left open to international traffic," and that the "liberty of access to ports granted to
foreign vessels implies their right to load and unload their cargoes; embark and disembark their passengers."4 The Third Restatement of the Foreign ReiatimlS Law of
the United States swnmarizes the legal principle as follows: " In general, maritime
ports are open to foreign ships on condition of reciprocity, . . . but the coastal State
may temporarily suspend access in exceptional cases for imperative reasons . ... "5
At the same time, each port State has the sovereign right to deny entry and to establish reasonable conditions related to access to its internal waters, harbors,
roadsteads and ports.6 Indeed, apart from certain pronouncements, there is little
actual support for the broad statement that ports can only be closed for "vital interests" or "imperative reasons" as a fundamental p rinciple of customary international law.1 The 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law ofthe Sea (1982 LOS
Convention)8 "contains no restriction on the right of a state to establish port entry
requirements .... "9 Article 25, entitled "Rights of protection of the coastal State,"
provides: "In the case of ships proceeding to internal waters or a call at a port facility outside internal waters, the coastal State ... has the right to take the necessary
steps to prevent any breach of the conditions to which admission of those ships to
internal waters or such a call is subject."10 While the United States signed the "Part XI
Agreement," which incorporates almost all of the 1982 LOS Conventions in 1994,
the United States Senate has not yet ratified or acceded to it. Even so, the United
States has long considered the navigation-related principles contained in the 1982
LOS Convention to reflect customary international law, binding on all States. II
After carefully examining the relevant authorities cited in support of such a
right-of-port-entry principle in the Aramco case, Professor A. V. Lowe concluded
that international law does not so severely restrict the authority of a port State to
close a port or impose conditions on entry.12 He convincingly distinguished between a right of entry and a presllmption of entry, concluding that " the ports of a
State which are designated for international trade are, in the absence of express
provisions to the contrary made by a port State, presumed to be open to the
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merchant ships of all States .... [S]uch ports should not be closed to foreign merchant ships except when the peace, good order, or security of the coastal State necessitatesclosure."1 3Another knowledgeable observer went even further: "There is
a presumption that all ports used for international trade are open to all merchant
vessels, but this is practice o nly, based upon convenience and commercial interest;
it is not a legal obligation .... Pursuant to [their sovereignty over their internal waters], states have absolute control over access to their portS." 14 The United States
Supreme Court observed that the internal waters and territorial sea are "subject to
the complete sovereignty of the nation, as m uch as if they were a part of its land territory, and the coastal nation has the privilege even to exclude foreign vessels altogether."15 In another case, the Suprem e Court concluded that Congress had "the
power ... to condition access to our ports by foreign-owned vessels upon submission to any liabilities it may consider good American policy to exact."16
Whether States view port entry as an international obligation or one granted
based on international comity and domestic self-interest, they typically do not undertake to deny entry to their ports without good cause. Before restricting entry to its
ports, a State must have good policy reasons to do so. "Vital interests," "imperative
reasons" or what factors may " necessitat [e[ closure" or constitute "good policy" include such obvious ones as national security or public health. However, acceptable
State practice includes closing a port to enforce an embargo, to sanction hostile behavior by another State, to impose a political reprisal l7 or to promote other significant interests as the port State m ay determine to be appropriate and necessary.18
There is a good deal of foreign State practice supporting the imposition of a
broad spectrum of conditions governing port entry and the exercise of jurisdiction
in port. 19 Today, there is general agreement " that the coastal state has full authority
over access to ports and is competent to exercise it, virtually at will, to exclude entry
by foreign vesse1s."2(1 Among appropriate entry conditions are complying with pilotage requirements, obeying traffic separation schem es and paying customs d uties.
Port States have even greater rights to limit or control entry with respect to certain
categories of vessels, such as warships, nuclear-powered vessels, fishing boats and
recreational craft. Absent agreement between the States concerned, foreign warships have no general expectation ofbeingpermittedentry 21and must request permission to make a port call in each casc. 22 International law also permits port States
to deny or condition entry as they see fit to foreign-flag fishing boats2.1 and private
recreational craft.2A Some port States m ay consider that the domestic political costs
of approving nuclear-powered or -armed vessels entry to their waters are too
high,25 while granting port entry to warships, fishing vessels and private recreational craft does not promote the overriding interests of the port State in international trade that foreign- flag comm ercial vessels directly serve.
36

William D. Baumgartner and John T. Oliver
Just as there is a presumption that a port State may not properly bar a foreign
commercial vessel from entry into its ports absent adequate justification, the affected flag State and the international community would view with concern the
imposition of unreasonable, arbitrary or discriminatory requirements for access.26
" It is .. . possible that closures or conditions of entry which are patently unreasonable or discriminatory might be held to amount to an abus de droit, for which the
coastal State might be internationally responsible even if there was no right of entry
to the port."27 However, both conventional and customary international law permit a State to impose reasonable restrictions on port entry.28 The possible conditions on entry run from those historically designed to ensure that vessel and crew
are free from infectious diseases, and that customs duties have or will be paid, to
provisions ensuring that promises to use the services of a pilot when entering or exiting
port, and to moor or anchor as directed, are kept. These also include those securityrelated concerns so important in a post-9f!! world, such as submission of passenger and crew lists and cargo manifests, and a willingness to wait beyond the limits
of the territorial sea until an inspection of the vessel with radiation monitoring
equipment can be completed. 29
Of course, under the fundamen tal international legal principle of pacta SUflt
servaflda, nation-States must comply with international agreements to which they
are party. Hundreds of bilateral fr iendship, commerce and navigation (FeN) treaties govern the circumstances under which those party to the agreements permit
port entry to the other.30 Such FeN treaties confirm the general presumption that
ports will be open and unrestricted by unreasonable conditions. Whether these bilateral FeN or "most-favored-nation" treaties concerning commerce and navigation reflect customary international law or may have helped established a rule of
customary law, there is a general expectancy that, when entered into, commercial
vessels of either party will be able to trade with any foreign port, and will need to
comply only with standard and necessary port ent ry conditions and expectations.31
Here again, international practice is to exclude warships and fishing vessels from
the general presumption of entry.32 Whether at sea or in port, warships and other
sovereign immune vessels are subject only to the enforcement jurisdiction of the
flag State.33 If a sovereign immune vessel engages in an activity in violation of the
law of the port State, local authorities may direct that the vessel leave immediately
and may seek damages through diplomatic channels resulting from the actions of
foreign sovereign immune vessels.:l4
Although a port State has a right to condition entry to its ports based on a broad
spectrum of concerns, any such restrictions entail costs. The costs include those directly involved in administering the conditions, from processing the paperwork to
conducting any ship inspections that may be necessary. Such direct costs may be
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fully or partially offset with appropriate port-entry, pilotage, mooring or anchorage fees. But the most significant burden entails the economic, political and other
costs involved in slowing, complicating or otherwise interfering with the smooth
and efficient flow of international trade. Whether a nation's port-entry scheme requires a merchant vessel to wait outside port until it receives clearance, embarks a
pilot or agrees to submit to a search, or imposes such an extensive planning, inspection or reporting system on shipping companies or ship masters that it is no
longer attractive to do business with a certain nation or port, any such conditions
on port en try make international trade more time-consuming, difficult and costly.
The 1965 Convention on Facilitation ofInternational Maritime Traffic, modeled
on earlier international efforts to improve international air traffic, emphasizes the
importance of simplifying and reducing to a minimum the administrative burdens
imposed on international shipping "to fac ilitate and expedite international maritime traffic .... "35 International legal principles also expect that port States will extend "equality of treatment" to prohibit discrimination in all rules governing port
entry and conditions and procedures applied to foreig n commercial vessels. 36
Given the crucial importance of international trade in today's global economy,
the cumulative impact of incremental costs, short delays or minor disruptions can
have a profoundly adverse impact. In this regard, harmonizing and coordinating
conditions on port entry throughout the world community, with similar expectations, requirements, forms and procedures, can achieve the desired goals without
imposing as much of an administrative burden. Wisely balancing the benefits to be
achieved from imposing conditions on port entry, such as intelligently devised securityrequirements, against the costs and burdens associated with each is essential.
As one commentator obselVed, with respect to the broader efforts to protect the
nation's security against potential terrorist attacks, "Ultimately, getting homeland
security right is not about constructing barricades to fend off terrorists. It is, or
should be, about identifying and taking the steps necessary to allow the United
States to remain an open, prosperous, free, and globally engaged society."37 Promoting relatively unrestricted oceangoing trade is essential to the continued economic vitality of the world. As Dr. ' ames Carafano, senior fellow fo r National
Security and Homeland Security at the Heritage Foundation, obSClVed: "Global
commerce is the single greatest engine in economic growth and it's the single most
important thing that raises the standard of living for every human being on the
planet."38 The goal of policymakers and the attorneys and other subject-matter experts who advise them must be to find an appropriate balance that fos ters effective
and workable limitations on port entrydirect1y related to promoting the important
goals to be achieved, while avoiding unnecessarily burdensome restrictions and
procedures that merely hamper free international navigation and trade.
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11. Historical Background, Contemporary Context and Analytic.al Structure

A. Historical Background
Seaborne commerce has been a vitally important part of the world's economy ever
since mankind began to engage in substantial trade with his neighbor. Portuguese,
Chinese, Arabian, Indian, Italian, Dutch, Spanish and English ships competed with
each other over the centuries to dominate key trade routes and control the supply
of commodities and other valuable goods. Global maritime trade has been a vital
component in stimulating international relationships and economic growth. Indeed, perhaps the most impressive structural development in the history of world
growth and development has been oceangoing trade. Particularly for goods carried
in quantity or bulk, water transportation has long been cheaper and more efficient
and-until the advent of railways, modern highways and trucks, and airplanesusually a good deal fas ter than the alternative transportation modalities.
At the same time, history has demonstrated the risks associated with maritime
activities. Too often, the crews of seagoing vessels were engaged in activities less benign than mutually beneficial, arm's-length trading. Pirates and privateers
wreaked havoc on ships engaged in peaceful trade. Coastal raiders, such as the Hittites in the twelfth century BC, and Vikings around the tenth century AD, ravaged
shipping, ports and peoples. Vicious oceangoing criminals have preyed on those
weaker than themselves along the coasts of Africa and Southeast Asia for thousands
of years. Powerful maritime States engaged in the conquest of foreign lands and
monopolization of vital shipping lanes and key trading ports and nations. From
seaborne attacks against ports in the Mediterranean to the surprise attack on Pearl
Harbor, States have sought to exploit coastal waters to wage aggressive warfare.
History has demonstrated that the tremendous benefits of international ocean
commerce must be balanced against the potential risks. Even so, while the history
of international ocean trade no doubt has demonstrated the potential for adverse
activities and consequences, including imperialism, colonization, conflict, piracy
and maritime terrorism, seaborne commerce has long been a vital component in
promoting global economic growth and improving living conditions worldwide.:W

B. Contemporary Context
Nothing in history rivals the scale on which the world community trades by sea today. Moreover, world trade has been growing at 6-10 percent each year. 40 Ocean
commerce will no doubt become increasingly vital in years to come. Some 9S percent of the world's trade today is dependent on maritime commerce. Ifit were not
for ocean transport of key commodities, such as oil and natural gas, cereal grains,
such as wheat and rice, and construction materials, many of the world's peoples
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would not have power for their transportation and electrical systems, food for their
tables or homes for their families. Increasingly, international trade has focused on
high-value items, such as automobiles, televisions, furniture and expensive entertainment systems. Specially constructed roll-on, roll-off vehicle carriers and container ships carrying thousands of interchangeable sealed containers transport
cargoes worth hundreds of millions of dollars. Often, the value of the cargo far exceeds the value of the ship. The nations of Asia, in particular Japan, South Korea,
Thailand, Singapore, India and, increasingly, China (via modern po rt facilities in
Hong Kong and, increasingly, on the mainland), dominate high-value ocean
trade. 41 These States use a good portion of the profits from this trade to purchase
oil and natural gas from the energy-rich Middle East, Indonesian archipelago, and
parts of western Africa. Supertankers transport huge amounts of oil and liquefied
natural gas (LNG) tankers carry tremendous volumes of natural gas through restricted waters of southeastern Asia to the vibrant, but energy-dependent, economies of North and South America, Europe, and South and East Asia.
Despite the tremendous worldwide econom ic growth exemplified by China, India, Brazil and several o ther developing States, the American economy remains, by
far, the largest and most dynamic in the world. It would be difficult to exaggerate
the importance of the maritime transportation component to this nation's economy. When measured by volume, more than 95 percent of international trade that
enters or leaves this country does so through the nation's ports and inland waterways.42 In 2004, US ports handled almost twenty million multimodal shipping
containers. 43 Container ships, which account for only eleven percent of the annual
tonnage of waterborne overseas trade, account for two-thirds of the value of that
trade. Several of the 326 or so seagoing ports in the United States, including Los
Angeles/Long Beach, New York, Houston, San Francisco and Baltimore, are
among the busiest in the world in one or more categories. 44 In excess of two billion
tons of domestic and international commerce now are carried on the water, creating m o re than thirteen million jobs and contributing more than $742 billion to the
gross national product. 4 S M ultimodal freight transportation accounts for nearly 15
percent of services the United States trades internationally. Each year, some 7,500
vessels fl ying foreign flags make 5 1,000 calls in US ports. 46
Energy is also a critical and growing import into the United States. Large Am erican owned andJor operated tankers carry oil from Valdez, Alaska to terminals
and refineries on the West Coast. But a much larger volwne of oil is imported into
ports on the Gulf Coast fro m Mexico, Venezuela, Nigeria and the Middle East. 47
Increasingly, huge liquefied natural gas tankers call on US terminals to meet the
tremendo us and increasing American appetite for natural gas. 48 Presently, there
are only six LNG terminals in the United States, but there are plans under way to
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build dozens more.49 Because the volume of international trade is expected to double
by 2020, and because the maritime transportation system is the nation's best means
of accommodating that growth, experts expect that the importance of seaports in the
US economy will continue to grow dramatically over the coming years. 50
While trade has grown dramatically, the potential national security risks are also
far greater and more complex today than they have ever been in the past. To illustrate, in December, 194 1, the Empire of Japan assembled a fleet consisting of six
aircraft carriers, thousands of men, hundreds of aircraft and scores of supporting
vessels (including submarines and mini-subs) to attack the US Navy and Army infrastructure at Pearl Harbor, Hawaii. This surprise attack killed some 2,403 service
members and sixty-eight civilians, seriously damaged or destroyed twelve warships
and 188 aircraft, caused hundreds of millions of dollars in damages to infrastructure, and plunged the United States into the Second World War. 51 Nearly sixty
years later, a mere fifteen Al-Qaeda terrorists hijacked four civilian airliners and
caused the death of nearly three thousand innocent civilians and wreaked incalculable financial costs by intentionally crashing three of the aircraft into the World
Trade Center towers and Pentagon. As a result, the United States is now engaged in
a "global war on terrorism" (GWOT), with hundreds of thousands of casualties
and hundreds of billions of dollars in costsY
Even this level of death and destruction would pale compared to the potential
numbers of casualties, and the hundreds of billions of dollars in potential destruction and disruption of global trade, were a nuclear device, "dirty bomb" or other
weapon of mass destruction to explode in a major port city, such as Long Beach or
Baltimore. 53 Experts fear that terrorists could hide such a device in one of the many
thousands of ubiquitous shipping containers imported into the United States every
day.54 Other scenarios, such as the possibility that terrorists would hijack an LNG
carrier and detonate the cargo in a populated or industrial area, could also result in
devastating destruction .55 Assuming a rational and effective connection between
restrictions on port entry and efforts to prevent such a disaster, a port State could
condition port entry on compliance with virtually any set of maritime security
measures consistent with international law. Likewise, port States could exert jurisdiction over fore ign -flag vessels voluntarily in port, other than sovereign immune
vessels, to carry out virtually any rational and effective security measure.
On the other hand, policy experts would argue that handcuffmg international
trade with irrational, excessive and ineffective restrictions would be counterproductive--enormously disruptive, h ugely expensive and fundame ntally unwise.56
Moreover, if the United States were to adopt a policy to conduct wide-ranging, intrusive security raids on board foreig n-flag vessels voluntarily present in US ports,
such heavy-handed tactics would likely prompt international censure and, to some
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extent, discourage trade. For national concerns of somewhat lesser magnitude,
such as to prevent customs violations or the importation of illegal drugs, the imposition of intrusive pre-entry requirements, while legal, should also be directly and
reasonably related to the goals to be accomplished.
C. Analytical Structure
In evaluating the legal principles governing the right of port States to impose conditions on port entry to promote maritime security, this article will consider various
facto rs. It will analyze the nature of the underlying activity, beginning with the most
long-standing ones that are directly re1ated to the vessel's visit to the particular port,
and proceeding through those which have only recently been considered as conditions for restricting port entry, such as requiring other flag States to cooperate in the
global war on terrorism. The more traditional, commonly required and obvious the
condition on port entry, the more likely it will meet standards of international law,
and also the more likely it will be widely regarded as prudent and necessary.
After analyzing the question of jurisdiction and the various types of underlying
activities, we will next consider the nature of the conditions to be imposed, from
something as unobtrusive as requiring the vessel to notify port a uthorities of its arrival, to a requirement to provide a list of the names and nationalities of all passengers and crew members, to submitting to an offshore inspection, to outright denial of
entry to the port. The conditions may extend beyond the immediate visit of the vessel
to the port State and include activities of the vessel on other occasions, of other ships
of that shipping company or even of other vessels of that flag State.
Finally, we will consider a list of relevant questions that a port State and the international community should ask with res pect to any proposed condition regulating entry into a port to ensure that it is reasonable and necessary. The questions
deal with a variety of facto rs, ranging from the importance of the goal the regulatory scheme is designed to achieve, to the geographical and temporal nexus between the vessel and the port State, to the effectiveness of the proposed regulation,
to the impact of the regulation on freedom of navigation and existing treaty obligations. The goal of this article is to develop and consider objective criteria to evaluate the legality and wisdom of conditions on port entry.

III. Conditions on Entry Directly Related to the Vessel's Port Visit
A. Port Security

Historically, as well as presently, the most vital single concern that a port State has
had with respect to oneo r more foreign vessels entering its ports and internal waters involves its own security. As the United States Supreme Court has expressed it,
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"[ I]t is 'obvious and unarguable' that no governmental interest is more compelling
than the security ofthe Nation."s7 As the English, Irish and French lookouts and
private citizens stared awestruck out to sea in the years around the turn of the first
millennium, they did not wonder whether the dozen or so longboats manned by
Viking warriors they observed rowing into their ports or up their rivers were coming to engage in peaceful and productive trade. Instead, they were convinced, based
on dreadful experience, that these Vikings were hell-bent on raiding their port villages, pillaging their riches, and abusing and murdering the inhabitants. In short,
the security of their homeland was in peril.
For what good it might do, a port or nation obviously has always had the right to
prohibit the entry of any vessel determined to inflict death and destruction upon it .
In like manner, the port State could mandate a requirement that the pirate ship or
foreign -flag raider disarm itselfbefore entering, or sign a promise that no member
of the crew would engage in any violent or illegal activities while in port. The problem was that, when faced with marauding Chinese pirates, Phoenician raiders or
Vikings, the denizens of the beleaguered coastal port usually did not have the resources to insist on anything of the sort. Instead, the security forces and inhabitants
could only run deep into the forest, row or sail further up the river, or climb the
nearest mountainside, hoping that the raiders would not find the treasure hidden
in the well or overtake and murder them as they fled.
Of course, pirates and other maritime raiders no longer represent a direct threat
to Los Angeles, Lisbon or Sydney. Nonetheless, in the wake of9/ 11 , national security concerns remain paramount throughout the world. Experts conclude that the
greatest single security risk to America and its allies today is a surreptitious terrorist
attack on, or by way of, port cities using nuclear weapons. 58 To prevent the massive
nwnber of innocent deaths, physical destruction and financial disruption that this
would entail,59 a port State may legally do almost anything reasonably necessary to
protect against such a threat. This article will discuss in detail the various possibilities of how far a port State may go to ensure port security during times of war or to
protect against actual or potential threats to national security, such as from possible terrorist attacks. 60 Before doing so, however, we will first analyze the traditional
requirements for port entry properly demanded of bona fide commercial vessels to
comply with domestic laws to ensure good order and to protect the legitimate interests of the port State.
B. Fiscal, Immigration, Sanitation and Customs Laws and Regulation s
Beyond seeking to ensure the security of the port State, the most long-standing,
traditional requirements attendant to a commercial vessel entering a foreign port
facility are those that pertain to compliance with port State laws involving fiscal,
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immigration, sanitation and customs (FISC) matters. From the time that the city
fathers of Venice imposed import taxes on the foreign merchants seeking entry to
trade their spices or other exotic wares, or the authorities ofTokyo required foreign
ships to comply with domestic laws related to sanitation, health and immigration,
coastal States have exacted financial requirements and imposed requirements to
ensure that their citizens benefited from seaborne trade, rather than suffered adverse consequences.
All States today agree with the basic principle that a port State may condition a
foreign ship's entry to port upon compliance with laws and regulations governing
" the conduct of the business of the port ... provided that these measures comply
with the principle of equality of treatment" among foreign-flag vessels. 61 In the
United States, Congress has provided for a regulatory scheme related to each FISCrelated requirement, incl uding port clearance and entry procedures,62 payment of
tonnage and customs duties,6l restrictions on immigration/'"' and sanitation and
health regulations.65 No one doubts the legal authority for, indeed the necessity of,
denying entry of a fo reign ship to a port if passengers or members of the crew on
board carry a serious infectious disease, such as tuberculosis or the plague.66 Likewise, a port State may take necessary and effective steps, such as requiring that a local
public health official first visit the vessel to confirm that the crew and passengers
are all free of infectious disease, before granting port entry.67 International law
grants to port States the right to take necessary and appropriate actions to prevent
the entry into the port of stowaways, absconders, deserters or other illegal immigrants. 68 Among those is the right to inquire as to nationality, demand to see each
passport or other identifying document and determine the status and intentions of
crew members and passengers.
For many years, each port State established its own paperwork and procedural
requirements for foreign vessels to complete and submit. As international trade became more universal and essential, the hundreds of different procedural requirements and forms became burdensome, particularly where the failure to complete a
particular document in a particular way caused the responsible b ureaucrat to deny
or delay port entry, or to delay departure. In some ports, a customs official would
"overlook" a missing document or "assist" a master in filling out the required
forms properly in exchange for an under-the-table payment. Even where no bribes
or other chicanery was involved, the cost, confusion and delay inherent in complying with varying local laws and completing a plethora of different documents were
considerable.
To help ameliorate the problem of burdensome forms and differing port-entry
requirements, the 1965 London Convention on the Facilitation of International
Maritime Traffic (FAL) established standard practices with respect to documents
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and procedures that a port State may require a foreign vessel to subm it prior to or
upon port entrance. 69 Because it makes so much practical sense, the international
community has embraced the Convention .7° In implementing the FAL Convention to promote maritime efficiency, the International Maritime Organization
(IMO) has developed recommended practices and prepared several standardized
documents for port States to use. 71 Near universal agreement with what a port State
could impose with respect to fiscal, immigration, sanitation and customs requirements, and standard forms and procedures, has greatly improved compliance and
promoted international trade. While a port State not party to the FAL Convention
could legally deviate from the IMO FISC-related standards as a condition for port
entry, to do so would be self-defeating. No State wants to discourage international
seaborne trade or, without good reason, increase the costs and delays associated
with it. As a result, virtually all port States, whether or not party to the FAL Convention, use the standardized forms and follow the prescribed procedures.
C. Navigation. Pilotage and Mooring and Anchorage Requirements
Port States have also traditionally imposed on visiting vessels the obligation to
comply with requirements designed to ensure safe navigation within their internal
waters and the operational efficiency of their ports. AJ; Professors Myres McDougal
and William Burke observed: 12
Once vessels enter internal waters and are within state territory. states claim sole
competence to prescribe for activities reJating to the use of the waters. In the port, for
example. coastal states claim autho rity to regulate the myriad activities connected with
port operation such as the movement and anchorage of vessels . .. , assignments of
berths, and numerous other events directly affecting the use of the area.

Applicable requirements range from rules mandating use of a pilot-often depending on the size of the vessel, its cargo, horsepower of its plant, and conditions
of weather or tide-to manning and equipment expectations, to requirements as
to where the vessel must anchor or moor. To have access to ports, all merchant vessels must follow the rules.
AJ; a foreign vessel, particularly any large and unwie1dy vessel, approaches the
busy and restricted internal waters of a port, authorities of the port State usually require that a pilot boat meet it several miles from restricted waters. From the pilot
boat emerges an expert mariner, with an intimate knowledge and familiarity about
the waters, currents, shoals, winds and other peculiarities of the port, and who is
comfortable in handling a wide range of merchant vessels in any kind of weather,
tide, traffic, current and light conditions. The United States is one of many port
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States that condition a foreign vessel's right of entry to its ports upon compliance
with non-discriminatory pilotage laws and regulations. n In a federal law that
traces its origins to 1789, pilots and the laws concerning the use of pilots to enter US
ports are generally governed by applicable state laws, rather than any federally mandated requirements.7 4 The purpose of pilotage laws is to better ensure that a vessel
can enter and operate within a port safely. The practice of requiring pilots in the
world's major ports and restricted waterways to ensure the safe entry and departure oflarger commercial vessels is increasingly common worldwide. For example,
among other requirements, the People's Republic of China now requires the use of
licensed pilots for all foreign commercial vessels calling on any of its ports. 7S
Proper port management also requires that port State authorities designate
when, where, how and under what circumstances a vessel can navigate in inland
ports and waterways.7 6 Anyone who has passed through the Panama Canal can attest to the scores of merchant ships "waiting their tum" anchored at either the Atlantic or Pacific side until such time as the local authorities and a qualified pilot are
ready to take them.17 Managing vessel traffic in the busy, fifty-six-mile-Iong Houston Ship Channel is nearly as hectic.78 Without some degree of coordination and
control over vessel operations, the complicated ballet of ships navigating the channel, anchoring or mooring at the appropriate places, and on-loading and off-loading
cargoes could not be done safely or efficiently. An obvious permissible condition
on port entry is a vesse1's willingness to use (and pay for) a qualified pilot and to
follow the rules of the port and directions from the harbor master and other authorities as to when, where and how to proceed. Failure to comply with these requirements means that the vessel would not be permitted to enter port or, once
there, would be subject to enforcement jurisdiction.
D. Ability of the Vessel to Operate Safely
Another significant goal of the port State is to ensure, as a condition of entry, that
vessels entering a port will be able to navigate and operate safely.79 Unsafe vessels
and poorly trained crews present a major threat to the proper operation of a port
facility and the coastal waters nearby. Those include vessels that are unseaworthy
because they were not designed or constructed correctly or do not have proper
equipment; are inadequately maintained; or have an improperly trained, manned
or certified crew. The Transportation Safety Act includes special precautions that a
port State may impose with respect to vessels carl)'ing particularly hazardous materials, such as a cargo of explosives, radioactive materials or liquefied natural gas.so
Unless the port authorities are convinced that a vessel transporting oil or other
hazardous materials has the ability to enter port, conduct business there and depart
the area safely, they are under no obligation to grant access to their internal waters
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or ports. SI Moreover, a port State has a right to insist, as a condition of entry, that
the vessel and its crew have demonstrated that they are capable of operating
safely and have no track record of maritime accidents.82 The 1982 LOS Convention imposes a "duty to detain" on port States which have determined that a foreignflag vessel within one of their ports is in violation of applicable international rules
and standards relating to seaworthiness of vessels and thereby threatens damage to
the marine environment.83 Finally, a port State may require, as a condition of entry, that the vessel is equipped with the latest IMO-approved safety technology to
avoid collisions and groundings. 84
International commerce would come to a virtual halt if the authorities in each
port took it upon themselves to impose unique requirements as to how a ship
should be constructed, equipped, manned, trained and operated. As a result, the
international community has established detailed rules for most aspects of the
construction, equipping, operations, manning and training of merchant vessels
above a certain size. Of all the conventions dealing with maritime safety, the most
important is the 1974 International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea
(SOLAS), as amended. 85 The original version was adopted in 1914 in response to
the sinking of the luxury passenger liner RMS Titanic, and the resulting loss of
more than fifteen hundred lives. 86 The latest version of SOLAS was adopted in
1974 and has been amended periodically since then. Under SOLAS, classification
societies carefully swvey (inspect) vessels during and immediately after construction to ensure compliance with international standards for strength, stability,
damage control, safety and equipment. Defects must be corrected prior to satisfactorily completing the survey. Only then does the classification society issue a certificate documenting the conditions under which the vessel may safely operate.
Although flag States have the primary responsibility to ensure ships flying their
flag are properly documented, port States party to the SOLAS Convention have a
duty to "intervene" to prevent a vessel from sailing until the owners and crew correct any unsafe conditions.87
Another multilateral treaty, the International Omvention on Standards of
Training, Certification and Watchkeeping for Seafarers, 1978 (STCW Convention),88
seeks to ensure that the vessel's crew members, particularly the master and thevessel's other officers. complete rigorous training on engineering. watch standing,
ship handling. maintenance. rules of the nautical road. firefighting and damage
control. and other emergency procedures. Only after he or she satisfactorily completes all aspects of training and demonstrates adequate experience and confidence under instruction is a crew member certified as qualified to serve. A major
revision of the STCW Convention that the IMO completed in 1995 provides an
even greater level of precision and standardization. The 1995 Amendments also
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enhanced port State control, providing a specific right of intelVention and detention in the case of a collision, grounding or other casualty, or evidence of erratic
ship handling. 89
These STeW requirements provide qualification standards and expectations
for seafarers. Ideally, a French master in charge of a supertanker sailing from the
Persian Gulfto Europe and back will have the same high level of qualifications as a
South Korean master on a massive container ship sailing to and from Singapore
and Southern California. Each should be able to safely navigate any vessel in his
charge through any weather or casualty that might arise. The STCW Convention
covers many other matters related to maritime safety, induding mandatory crew
rest and periodic recertification. Under US law, no vessel may enter or operate in
the navigable waters of the United States unless such vessel complies with all applicable laws and regulations designed to promote maritime safety,90
From the perspective of the port State, the local authorities have the right to inquire whether the vessel's SOLAS certification and documentation are in order,
and if all the crew have their required and up-to-date STCW certificates, prior to
allowing the vessel to enter port.91 Ensuring that a port visit will be completed
safely is an essential port State fu nction, and any requirement reasonably related to
this goal is permissible as a condition on port entry.92 Ifport State authorities consider it to be essential or helpful to accomplish this purpose, they may direct that
the visiting vessel submit to a boarding to verify the accuracy of the information
provided and, in cases of doubt, to physically check the seaworthiness of the vessel
and qualifications of its crew. Where a pilot is required to be on board, he or she
may not proceed into port unless the appropriate authorities are confident that the
vessel is shipshape in every respect.
The United States Congress recently imposed a safety-related requirement,
which the Coast Guard has begun to implement, that virtually all commercial vessels operating in US navigable waters carry a properly function ing Automatic Identification System (AlS).93 "AlS-equipped vessels will transmit and receive
navigation information such as vessel identification, position, dimensions, type,
course, speed, navigational status, draft, cargo type, and destination in near real
time."9.4 AlS can prove essential to avoid collisions and groundings, monitor vessel
traffic flow, and, as discussed below, help identify and track vessels of interest for
security purposes as part of Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA).9S "Once a potential threat has been identified, a port or coastal State must have the capability to
detect, intercept and interdict it using patrol boats or maritime patrol aircraft.
Such action could disrupt planned criminal acts and prevent the eventuality of a
catastrophe before it threatens the port. "96 Other safety-related technology that the
United States requires of most commercial and certain other vessels calling on US
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ports includes IMO-approved electronic position-fixing devices,97 automatic radar
plotting aids 98 and emergency communications systems.99
E. Voyage Information

Another area of inquiry that port States usually make of vessels calling on their
ports is that relating to voyage information. One common condition of port entry
is providing a vessel's Notice of Arrival (NOA), including advance information as
to the date and time it expects to reach port. Under current US Coast Guard regulations, modified following 9/1 1, visiting ships must generally provide NOA information ninety-six hours prior to arrival. lOO The infonnation required in an NOA is
extensive, including the name of the vessel, flag State, registered owner, operator,
charterer and classification society.lOl Other voyage information required is the
names of the last five ports or places visited, dates of arrival and departure, ports
and places in the United States to be visited, the current location of the vessel, telephone contact information, detailed information on the crew and others on board,
operational condition of the essential equipment, cargo declaration and the additional information required under the International Ship and Port Facility Code
(ISPS Code}.102
The vessel must make an additional notice whenever there is a hazardous condition, either on board the vessel or caused by the vessel. 103 Failure to do so means
that the vessel will be denied entry and will have to wait outside of the port until
the Coast Guard and other port authorities are satisfied that they can safely clear
the ship.l04 Many of the NOA requirements are related to port security concerns.
The ninety-six-hour reporting requirement permits Coast Guard and other authorities time to run the vessel through the appropriate au tomated databases to
try to identify terrorist threats, suspected involvement in drug trafficking or
trafficking in illegal immigrants, suspicious or hazardous cargo, and any other
special vulnerabilities. By identifying the current flag State, port State authorities
can determine whether the fl ag State is party to international procedures to reduce the risk of a terrorist attack, whether the vessel in question has been
prescreened at its previous port of call and whether there is an applicable agreement permitting at-sea searches. The NOA regime also provides adequate time to
arrange fo r pilotage and tug escorts and plan for the optimal use of limited port
resources. International law clearly permits port States to require foreign merchant vessels to provide such information directly related to the voyage as a condition of entry, particularly where the IMO has made such requirements
mandatory for all vessels.!Os
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IV. Conditions on Entry Related to Nation al Defense, Homeland Security,
Counterterrorism and Law Enforcement Concerns
A. Vessels from Enemy, Hostile, Unfriendly or Rogue States
A port State has an absolute right to deny entry to its ports to foreign warships and
certain other categories of ships it considers threatening. 106 Although their sovereign
status gives warships special immunities from enforcement jurisdiction, a port State
is within its rights to require prior authorization, deny entry for any cause or no
cause at all, or condition access, such as limiting the nwnber of warships that may be
in port at anyone time, or requiring that the vessel enter and leave port only during
daylight hours. I07 Even where there is an FCN treaty granting to each party reciprocal
rights to enter each other's ports, the provisions usually exclude routine entry rights
for "vessels of war. "108 Article 13 of the Statute on the International Regime ofMaritime Ports specifically excludes its application to warships. 109 The recognition that
international law gives to port State discretion with respect to providing entry to
warships is due to the special sovereign immune character of warships, the potential threat that they might represent to the security of the port State and the lack of
reciprocal benefits that accrue to the port State when a merchant vessel engages in
trade.I iO As a general rule, therefore, warships must make special arrangements and
obtain prior permission before entering a foreign port. III
The power to deny entry to enemy or potentially hostile vessels is an obvious security precaution that States have followed for centuries. However, warships are
not the only vessels to which a port State may deny entry for security reasons. In
October 2006, the Japanese government barred all ships from North Korea, including commercial vessels and scheduled passenger ferries, from entering any of its
ports due to the "gravest danger" represented by the underground nuclear-weapons
test in that rogue State. 112 Australia followed suit, banning all North Korean ships
from entering its ports except in dire emergencies. 1I3 The United States has taken
even broader action against rogue States. In its most recent Maritime Operational
Threat Response Plan, which is published as part of the National Strategy for Maritime Security, the US government listed six States as non-entrant countries. The six
presently on the list are Cuba, Iran, Libya, North Korea, Sudan and Syria. 1I4 The
Secretary of Homeland Security is charged with denying entry to all such vessels "to
the internal waters and ports of the United States and, when appropriate, to the territorial seas of the United States. "liS
The right to deny port entry in times of actual or perceived threats to national
security is well established in international law. In the early 1900s, Venezuela
dosed its ports to the vessels of a single US shipping company during a period of
revolutionary activity in that nation. The steamship company
suit before an

moo

50

William D. Baumgartner and John T. Oliver
international arbitral tribunal complaining that the denial of access to Venezuelan
ports was arbitrary and discriminatory, particularly since those same ports remained open to vessels from other companies. 116 Venezuela claimed that it had denied port entry to that company's vessels to prevent rebel fo rces from receiving
support and supplies, and that the steamship company in question was the only
one friendly to the rebels. The umpire found that the prohibition was pennissible,
opining that " the right to open and close, as a sovereign on its own territory, certain
harbors, ports or rivers in order to prevent the trespassing of fiscal laws is not and
could not be denied to the Venezuelan Government, m uch less this right can be denied when used . . . in defense of the existence of the Government."117
At the same time, US government officials may not act arbitrarily in denying
port entry, even when based on security concerns. In 1950, President Truman, acting under the authority of the Magn uson Act, 50 US Code sec. 191, issued Executive Order 10,173, granting to cognizant officials of the US Coast Guard the
authority to deny entry to US ports offoreign-flag vessels, or direct their anchorage
and movement in US waters, as may be "necessary . . . to prevent damage or injury
to any vessel or waterfront facility or waters of the United States .... "118 In Canadian Transport Co. v. United States, a Canadian corporation brought action against
the United States for damages for the Coast Guard's refusal to permit a merchant
vessel having a Polish master and officers entry to harbor in Norfolk, Virginia, on
the basis that the presence of Communist bloc officers in that sensitive port might
pose a risk to national security.ll9 The District Court had entered summary judgment against plaintiff for failure to state a claim. 12o On appeal, however, the D.C.
Circuit held that "if the Coast Guard officers acted arbitrarily and in violation of
regulations in diverting [the foreign merchant vessel], the United States is not immune from a damage action .... "121 The Court returned the case to the District
Court for a factual hearing on that single issue.
B. Denial of or Restrictions o n Entry Related to Terrorism Con cerns
In recent years, international terrorism has replaced the Cold War and revolutionary zeal as the focus of greatest global security concern. Three trends--economic
globalization, diffusion of nuclear weapons technology and well-funded and fanatical terrorism-present an unprecedented security threat to the United States, its
trading partners and the whole world. 122 Given these trends, port States must do all
they can to keep foreign merchant ships out of their coastal waters if they represent
any kind of security risk; the stakes are simply too high. 123 According to Dr. Stephen Flynn, the current Jeane 1. Kirkpatrick Senior Fellow in National Security
Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations and an expert on the risk terrorists
pose to international trade, the essence of the terrorist strategy is global economic
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havoc: "There is a public safety imperative and a powerful economic case for advancing international trade security."124 Terrorism experts, and the terrorist organizations themselves, consider seaports to be particularly susceptible to attack.. 12$
Moreover, the proliferation of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction, and the means to deliver them, dramatically increase the threat. Osama
bin Laden is reported to have described the acquisition of nuclear weapons by AlQaeda as a "religious duty."126 An improvised nuclear weapon or "dirty bomb"
hidden in a shipping container, secreted into a port city and then detonated there
or after it has been loaded on a train or truck and in the transportation network
could cause hundreds of thousands of deaths, hundreds of billions of dollars in destruction and incalculable damage to the world's confidence in the global trading
system. To prevent a terrorist attack by means of a weapon of mass destruction is a
top priority, within both the United States and the international community.127
Moreover, traditional containment and deterrence strategies that worked during
the Cold War are no longer likely to succeed against fanatical terrorist groupS.128
Appropriate measures to reduce the risk of such an attack include any conditions
on port entty, or outright denial of such entry, designed to detect and deter terrorists; nuclear weapons and other instrumentalities of mass destruction; and other
weapons, supplies and materials used by terrorists from entering a port State.
While an attack with a nuclear weapon secreted on a container ship or otherwise
introduced into the transportation system poses the gravest danger to a port State,
a terrorist group could cause catastrophic damage using weapons widely available
to it, such as conventional explosives and rockets. Before 9/11, for example, few
would have guessed that a small group of committed, suicidal terrorists could have
caused so much death and destruction by commandeering civilian jetliners and
crashing them into the World Trade Center and Pentagon. 129 Various terrorist cells
are no doubt speculating even now on vulnerabilities in existing port security plans
and developing strategems to try to exploit them.
A port State has the right to deny entry or impose conditions on entry to its ports
when it determines such action to be necessary to protect the port or coastal State
and the security of the population against terrorist or other attacks. Indeed, under
the "vital interests" analysis discussed above, this fundame ntal principle is self-evident. Nothing could be more "vital" than defending the homeland against a massive terrorist attack. Following the terrorist attacks on 9/ 11, the US Congress
appropriated funds and passed laws, the Department of Homeland Security and
other cognizant agencies implemented new policies and procedures, and airport,
border, coastal, and port security has been strengthened considerably. Even so, experts agree that much more work needs to be done to make our nation's ports and
borders truly secure and prepared. 13(1
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There is an additional international legal basis for taking action against potential terrorist attacks-the fundamental right of self-defense. Article 51 of the
United Nations Charter provides: "Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the
inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs
against a Member of the United Nations ... ." While the United Nations originally
visualized this provision as applying to defending against armed attacks initiated
by other nation-States, such as Nazi Germany's attack on Poland on September I,
1939 or the invasion of South Korea by Communist North Korea in June, 1950, it
seems perfectly appropriate to extend the right of self-defense to deter attacks by
subnational terrorist groups, such as Al-Qaeda, in the GWOT. In the United States
today, the emphasis has changed from enforcing the law and responding to attacks,
to anticipating and preventing such attacks. III Intemationallaw limits what a nationState may do to protect itself against an armed attack by shooting first 132 or taking
preemptive military measures beyond its own territory.133 However, that paradigm
may be changing with respect to preemptive action in anticipation ofa terrorist attack. As the White House has argued:
We must adapt the concept of imminent threat to the capabilities and objectives of
today's adversaries. Rogue states and terrorists ... rely on actsofterror and, potentially,
the use of weapons of mass destruction .... To forestall or prevent such hostile acts by
our adversaries, the United States will, if necessary, act preemptively.l14

In order to better protect the homeland against a terrorist attack, individual
States and the international community must have adequate means to identify
and track weapons, vessels, cargo, passengers and crew, and to take appropriate
action against those that represent a threat. Some of the new programs designed
to improve coastal and port security against potential terrorist attacks include the
(I) Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), (2) Container Security Initiative (CSl),
(3) Automated Identification System (AlS), (4) Long-Range Identification and
Tracking (LRIT) of Ships, (5) International Port Security Program, and (6) other
initiatives to identify personnel and vessels that pose a security threat to the
United States and its trading partners and to devise and improve processes to detect and deter them. ns
One key reason for advancing the requirement of foreign vessels to provide a
Notice of Arrival at least ninety-six hours before they plan to enter a US port is to
ensure adequate time to check the accuracy and veracity of the details the vessel has
provided. l )6 In the United States, watch standers at the National Vessel Movement
Center (NVMC) monitor the data and evaluate and promulgate possible threats. 137
However, the decision to approve or disapprove port entry is left to the discretion
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of the Coast Guard Captain of the Port (COTP). u8 Implementing and improving
processes to identify and track vessels and their cargoes, and to ensure the reliability of their crews, will continue to be a key factor in ensuring the security of the
global transportation network in the United States and around the world. U9 This
article will now briefly consider several of these initiatives and programs.
( 1) Proliferatiot! Security Initiative
For many years, the United States and its allies were justifiably concerned about the
prospect of certain categories of weapons and delivery systems falling into the
hands of terrorists and rogue States. Various initiatives, including the Nuclear
Non-Proliferation Treaty, specifically addressed the concern of proliferation of
nuclear weapons and their delivery systems. Theconcem that outlaw States or international terrorists could get their hands on weapons of mass destruction intensified following the 9/ 11 terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon. President Bush announced the PSI on May 31, 2003, as a "new effort to fight
proliferation" through international agreements "to search ... ships carrying suspect cargo to seize illegal weapons or missile technologies." I40 The PSI was designed
to help fill in the gap in international law to ban the secretive and dangerous trade in
nuclear weapons, ballistic missiles, other weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems, and component materials. 141
The impetus to develop the PSI concept was largely due to the circumstances
surrounding the interdictio n of the North Korean freigh ter So Sat! som e six hundred miles off the Yemeni coast, which demonstrated the lack of international legal
tools then available.l4z American satellites and Navy ships had tracked the So Sat!
following its departure from North Korea in mid-November 2002. Since the vessel
was not flying a flag and there was intelligence information available that it was cartying ballistic missile components to Aden, Spanish naval vessels, in coordination
with the United States, stopped and boarded the So Sat! on the high seas. 143 The
crew of the So Sat! contended that the vessel was carrying a legal cargo of concrete
to Yemen and showed papers demonstrating that it was validly registered in North
Korea. Nonetheless, the search proceeded and uncovered Scud ballistic missile
components and chemicals necessary to fuel the missiles hidden beneath the concrete. After Yemen demonstrated that the cargo was perfectly legal under a standard sales and shipping contract, Spanish and American authorities eventually had
to acquiesce in the vessel continuing on to its destination.144
There was a general consensus within the Bush Administration, particularly
within the Department of Defense, that this was an unacceptable result and that
something had to be done to change existing law and operational procedures to
permit the interdiction of such shipments. 14SIn consultation with other concerned
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States, President Bush developed and announced the Statement of Imerdiction
Principles that States participating in PSI are "committed" to undertake. l46 Among
those steps the Statement lists as appropriate is that the States will stop and search
suspected vessels, and "enforce conditions on vessels entering o r leaving their
ports, internal waters, o r territorial seas that are reasonably suspected of carrying
[prohibited] cargoes, such as requiring that such vessels be subject to boarding,
search, and seizure of such cargoes prior to entry." 147 Although the Statement specifically provides that an y actions taken under the PSI will be "consistent with national legal authorities and relevan t international law and frameworks, including
the United Nations Security Council," some governments and observers are concerned that aspects of the PSI interdiction efforts beyond the limits of national jurisdiction may violate internationallaw. 148 However, if do ne with the cooperation
of the flag State and in compliance with the Statement, interdiction activities
should not raise any legal problems. Moreover, the United States and its allies
could use failure of the flag State to cooperate in the PSI as the basis for denying or
restricting port entry to vessels registered in that State.

(2) Contai"er Security Initiative
Another recent initiative to combat the risk of international terrorist attacks on US
ports is the CSI. 149 The CSt allows US customs agents, in coordination with foreign
governments, to prescreen high-risk cargo containers at the port of departure. ISO
Today the CSI process results in the preclearance of some 90 percent of the containers that enter US seaports and is in place in at least fifty major in ternational seaports around the world. lSI The CSI process consists offour key elements: ( 1) using
automated infonnation to identify and target high-risk containers; (2) prescreening
those containers identified as high risk before they leave foreign ports; (3) using
up-to-date detection technology to quickly and efficiently prescreen high-risk
containers; and (4) developing and using "smarter," more secure tamper-proof
containers.ls2
American citizens and allied nations expect that the United States will adopt
port entry requirements that are reasonably related to the real threat, effectively designed to respond properly to it, and no more costly or intrusive than reasonably
necessary. For example, a req uirement that every vessel b ringing containers in to a
US port must wait at a point 200 nautical miles from our shores un til the US Coast
Guard boards the vessel and opens and inspects every container on board would
not violate internationallaw. ls3 However, given the millions of containers in transit, the practical impossibility of searching them while on board a vessel under way,
and the costs and delays that any such effort would entail, this would be an unworkable and unwise policy. lSo! The CSI, on the o ther hand, focuses on a relatively
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small number of containers that security experts have determined to be "high risk."
Trained screening personnel, using the latest high-technology equipment,
prescreen these "high risk" containers while they are readily accessible, before they
are loaded on the vessel en route to the next port of call. Among other things, the
recently enacted Security and Accountability for Every Port Act (SAFE Act) codifies the Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism, a public-private sector initiative that offers international shipping companies benefits such as expedited
clearance through US ports in exchange for improvements in their internal security measures. 155 Giving preferential access to vessels from CSI ports is an efficient,
effective, legal and relatively inexpensive way to lower the threat of international
terrorism.
The fourth key element of the CSI process is to use technology to develop and
employ more secure containers. Perhaps the most promising option is to use the
latest sensor and computer technology to continually monitor the location, status
and cargo of each container. A requirement that every container entering the
United States carry a fully functional, self-contained tamper-resistant embedded
controller (TREC) would also be a reasonable condition of port entry, particularly
if industry were to agree to participate voluntarily or if it were part of an IMO vessel
security initiative. lSI> TREC technology is rapidly being refined and becoming
widely avaiiable. ls7 Various companies are developing and deploying TRECs that
use sophisticated operating systems and act as intelligent, real-time tracking devices. These devices are capable of detecting radiation, reporting tampering of the
container and, when coordinated with shipping plans entered into a computer,
identifying voyage routing and other anomalies. ISS
A pilot program is under way to permanently install such controllers on a large
nwnber of containers. Each unit uses the latest generation of satellite tracking devices and an advanced technology network for use by manufacturers, retailers, logistics providers, carriers and governments to share real-time cargo information.
In addition to detecting unauthorized access to the container and providing a constant infonnation stream as to location and status, the TREC controllers have the
potential to constantly monitor each container's contents to detect the presence of
radioactive materials and chemical and biological weapons. Any anomaly could
lead to a denial of port entry until such time as appropriate authorities could test
the container offshore or at a safe location.
Moreover, by enabling them to know exactly where each container is in the
world at all times, those depending on the shipments and efficient use of the containers would benefit enormously. For example, imagine that the BMW automobile plant located in Spartanburg, South Carolina is expecting a shipment of
necessary component parts from Gennany to arrive on August 1. Because of a
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severe Atlantic hurricane, however, the container ship must delay its arrival by several days. In ajust-in-time supply chain, such a delay could cause an expensive halt
in the assembly line. Knowing of the disruption and to avoid that production delay,
the factory might order an interim shipment of essential parts to be shipped by air.
All of this could be done automatically, saving millions of dollars in production delay and unnecessary warehousing. Another key business advantage, particularly to
the company that owns the shipping container, is that, as soon as the cargo is offloaded, it would become immediately available to pick up another shipment. Except for the most efficient companies, no one currently keeps track of millions of
such containers throughout the world. Detecting a weapon of mass destruction
thousands of miles from the United States, while an absolutely priceless security
benefit, would be '"'frosting on the cake" to the everyday value of a far more efficient
global supply system.
A similar tamper-resistant device could be developed to be permanently affixed
to each vessel in the world, no matter how small. Ideally, such devices could detect
the presence of dangerous materials on board or keep track of, and report on, routing anomalies. If US policymakers were to determine that such devices on containers or vessels would contribute meaningfully to our maritime security, they could
require that every vessel entering a US port be equipped with fully functional units
as a condition of port entry. Global cooperation to develop the best possible technology, and an international agreement to require the use of such technology on all
vessels, would be the best approach to the effective implementation of such requirements worldwide.
Even though the total cost to install a TREe on every container would be significant, unit costs would no doubt come down as mass production of the device was
begun and makers competed for their portion of the market to equip millions of
containers. Although the international community must expect growing pains as
the CSI becomes fully operational, initiatives to prevent the "bomb in a box" or
'"'bomb on board" scenario are important tools to protect homeland security and
the international transportation network against the threat of paralyzing and expensive terrorist attacks.
(3) Automated Identification System
Modern detection, information and communications technologies provide the
potential capability to accomplish much of what needs to be done to enhance the
security of the global maritime transportation system. Although initially introduced
as a collision avoidance and maritime safety tool, the IMO has recently promoted
AlS "as a mandatory prescription to the shipping industry's fear of terrorism."15'1
Although there were growing pains as the technology was developed, AlS has
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proven to be very helpful, both to mariners and flag and port State authorities.
Even before the emphasis shifted to combating terrorism , maritime experts had
identified satellite-based vessel monitoring systems as an invaluable tool fo r m anaging fishe ries and for promoting m aritime safety.l60 The Department of Hom eland Security has statutory authority to implement regulations to fully implement
AlS in the United States. 16 1 The Coast Guard also recognizes the need for such AIS
information to improve Maritime Domain Awareness by monitoring vessels approaching the US coastline and, ultimately, to develop the intelligence necessary to
help deter terrorist attacks on US portS. 162
The Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002163 and the Coast Guard and
Maritime Safety Act of 2004 164 required the Coast Guard to develop and implement a comprehensive vessel identification system . This system will enhance the
Coast Guard's capabilities to monitor vessels that could pose a threat to the United
States. 16S AlS is a relatively mature technology, having been a key component of
IMO's marine safety system for years. All vessels using the Vessel Traffic SelVice
while entering or leaving major ports in the United States must now em ploy AlS.
Consistent with internationally agreed vessel equipm ent standards, AlS is compulsory o n all large commercial vessels worldwide. Moreover, US law and regulations
require that it be operational on larger vessels entering US waters. l66 The United
States and its trading partners m ay further exploit AlS to keep track of vessels, with
satellite AIS tracking on the near-term horiwn. 167

(4) Long-Range Identification and Tracking o!Ships
The Long Range Identification and Tracking of Ships system is another IMO initiative under SOLAS.lMWhen it becomes fully operational in January 2009, LRIT will
require ships to which the requirement applies (passenger ships, cargo ships over 300
gross tons, including high-speed craft, and mobile offshore drilling units o n international voyages) to transmit their identities, locations, and dates and times of their positions. 169 That information m ay be accessed upon payment of the costs thereofby
port States for those ships that intend to enter ports of that State. Most significantly, coastal States may obtain access to the information when the ship is a designated distance off that State's coast, not to exceed one thousand nautical m iles. 170
As it is presently planned, there will be no interface between LRIT and AIS. One
of the more important distinctions between LRIT and AlS, apart from the obvio us one of range, is that, whereas AIS is a broadcast system available to all within
range, data derived thro ugh LRlT will be available only to the SOLAS contractinggovernment recipients who are entitled to receive such information. As a result,
the LRIT regulatory provisions have built-in safeguards to ensure the confidentiality of the data and prevent unauthorized disdosure or access. LRIT will be another
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tool to keep track of vessels that might represent a security threat. Traditional freedom of navigation principles prevent a coastal State from requiring AlS or LRIT
information on foreign-flag vessels merely navigating on the high seas or within
the exclusive economic zone, or engaged in innocent or transit passage through the
territorial sea. However, by adopting the AlS and LRIT amendments to SOLAS,
contracting governments may obtain available AIS and LRIT information from
other contracting States. Vessels from States that choose not to participate may be
subject to extra scrutiny and delay, additional port access screening or reporting requirements, or even outright denial of entry to ports.
(5) International Port Security Program
In December 2002, the IMO adopted a new set of rules for all States and international shipping companies. 171 These rules included changes to the Safety of Life at
Sea Convention through adoption of the ISPS Code. These came into effect on July
1, 2004. The ISPS Code requires States to assess the security risks at all port facilities
and to ensure that port operators prepare and implement security plans. Shipping
companies have to evaluate risks to their vessels and develop prevention and response plans. Moreover, ISPS requires that ships install AlS, develop ship security
alert systems, create a permanent display of their vessel identification numbers and
carry a valid International Ship Security Certificate. Assuming that vessels comply
with the ISPS requirements, port States may not take enforcement action against
the vessel, including denial of port entry, unless there are "clear grounds" for concluding that a vessel represents a security threat to the port State. Even then, international procedures encourage the port State to provide an opportunity for the
vessel to rectify the non-compliance.
Under US law, the Coast Guard is responsible fo r determining whether foreign
ports are maintaining effective anti-terrorism measures. 172 To do this, the Coast
Guard created the International Port Security Program. It generally uses a State's
implementation of the ISPS Code as the key indicator as to whether it has effective
anti-terrorism measures in place.173 When the Coast Guard determines that a foreign port is not maintaining effective anti-terrorism measures (normally by its
failure to fully implement the ISPS Code), the Coast Guard imposes conditions of
entry on vessels arriving in the United States from a port of that State. These conditions of entry usually require that the vessel take additional security measures,
both while in the foreign port and in the United States, to rectify the apparent
non-compliance. In addition, the Coast Guard will issue a port security advisory
concerning that port and publishes a notice in the Federal Register to provide
public notice of its determination. Should a vessel not meet those conditions or

59

Conditions on Entry of Foreign-Flag Vessels into US Ports
should there be additional "dear grounds" for concern, the vessel may be denied
entry into the United States.
Before allowing it to enter its first US port of call, the Coast Guard must board
and inspect each high-interest vessel before it enters the territorial sea or, d epending on local conditions, shortly thereafter. Before the Captain of the Port will permit the vessel to enter the US port, the inspection team must first determine that
the vessel has complied with special security conditions in the foreign port(s), conduct an inspection using radiation-monitoring equipment and impose certain additional security requirements. 17~ If the vessel is unwilling to subject itself to any of
these conditions or the inspection fails to resolve any security concerns, the COTP
has the authority to impose various "control and compliance measures," induding
denial of entry to the port. 175 Presently, the Coast Guard requires that foreign-flag
vessels list the five previous foreign ports on which they have called. 176 Since any
such measures would be designed to effectively reduce the risk of a terrorist attack
on a US port, imposing such non-discriminatory conditions on port entry comports with international law. Vessels that meet the requirements of the ISPS Code
and have called upon ports that are in compliance with the ISPS Code generally will
not be considered to be of "high interest" and will not typically be required to undergo inspections beyond the US territorial sea.
The effect of the ISPS Code and efforts to implement it around the world means
that today the IMO, the United States and the rest of the international shipping community has a much better handle than ever before on where all commercial vessels
are at anyone time, the nature of the potential security threat, how to avoid a terrorist incident and how best to respond to various other emergency situations.

(6) Other Programs Designed to Improve Vessel and Port Security
At the IMQ, within the US government, and in various international fora, responsible policy experts are engaged in an ongoing effort to review and improve programs designed to enhance the security of commercial vessels and ports. Time and
space does not permit a comprehensive review of all the various proposals. Suffice
it to note here that whatever international agreements the international community
develops to improve security against potential terrorist attacks m ust include appropriate legal and policy bases on which to impose conditions on entry into port.
C. Denial of or Restrictions on Entry Related to Suspected Criminal Activity
States have a right to require that vessels seeking to call on their ports will comply
with relevant criminal laws and regulations d esigned to protect the peace and security of the port State. Port State authorities may deny entry to, or impose extensive
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controls on, commercial vessels seeking access to their ports as they may deem necessary to ensure that any such vessels are not promoting criminal activities.
There is a vast array of potential criminal activities that can be promoted
through port entry, ranging from the importation of illegal drugs, trafficking in
women and children for various criminal purposes, maritime terrorism, illegal immigration, and other violations of customs and immigration laws and regulations.
To combat such illegal activities, States may require vessels visiting their ports to
submit to law enforcement boardings and investigatory screenings. Moreover, if
flag States, particularly "open registry" or "flags of convenience" States, are unwilling to take appropriate action to ensure that vessels that they have registered are
not engaged in criminal enterprises, a port State could appropriately deny entry to
vessels from such States. 177 All States naturally see effective crime prevention as a
vital State interest that justifies appropriate investigation and exercise of the sovereign right to close or protect access to their ports.
If a State is aware that a particular vessel, the vessels of a particular company, or
the vessels operating under the flag of a particular State are engaged or likely to be
engaged in criminal activity, that State's port authorities may deny entry to that
vessel or that group ofvessels. 178 Likewise, these authorities may require that those
vessels submit to a records review, a thorough search, and/or other personnel or
cargo screening as a precondition for entry. To increase security in the transportation industry, the US Congress established a requirement that all "crewmembers on
vessels calling at United States ports .. . carry and present on demand any identification that the Secretary decides is necessary. "179 This has evolved into the Department
of Homeland Security's initiative to establish a transportation workers identification credential (TWIC) for workers in the maritime industry. ISO In the SAFE Port
Act of 2006, Congress directed that persons convicted of certain crimes could not
obtain a TWIC, and that the TWIC process be in place at the ten most vulnerable
US ports by July 1,2007, and that the process be in place for the forty most vulnerable
ports by July 1, 2008. lSI The benefits of requiring and screening lists of crew and passengers in an NOA include the opportunity to detect those with criminal records. All
of these conditions on entry are well established in traditional State practice. 182
D. Balancing the Right of Port Entry in Emergency Cases of Force Majeure or
Distress with the Protection of the Vital Interest of the Port
There is one set of circumstances where customary international law generally recognizes a vessel's right to enter any port-where the ship is in distress due to force
majeure. I S3 Historically, a vessel in distress due to bad weather conditions, dangerous sea state, involvement in a collision, fire or other emergency condition threatening the loss of the vessel and the lives of those on board enjoyed a right to seek
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refuge in a foreign port, bay or other protected internal waters of a foreign coastal
State.lSo! The 1982 LOS Convention recognizes the principles of force majeure and
distress as permitting a ship to stop and anchor when in innocent or transit passage. ISS Moreover, both coastal States and individual mariners have an obligation
to take affirmative action to render assistance to vessels and persons "in danger of
being lost at sea."I66
As a general rule, vessels in distress have a right of entry into the internal waters
of a port State to seek shelter without first obtaining permission from that State, especially when there is the real risk that the vessel might be lost, thus putting the
lives of those on board at genuine risk. 187 Moreover, the sovereign authority of the
port State does not generally apply to vessels forced to seek refuge in a port by force
majeure or other necessity, except as may be necessaty to ensure the safe and efficient operation of the port. ISS Under long-standing principles of customaty international law, therefore, when a vessel is in extremis and must take shelter in a safe
harbor, the port State may not exclude the vessel fro m its internal waters and may
"not take advantage of the ship's necessity" in any way.IS9
On the other hand, port States have a right to protect themselves and their citizens under the principle of self-preservation. This basic principle gives such States
the right, indeed the fundamental responsibility, to keep dangerous instrumentalities and conditions away.l90 As Professors McDougal and Burke expressed it: "[ IJf
the entty of the vessel in distress would threaten the health and safety . .. of the port
and its populace, exclusion may still be permissible."191 The Netherlands Judicial
Division of the Council of State recently considered the conditions under which a
badly damaged Chinese vessel had a right to enter Dutch waters for the purpose of
effecting repairs in a shipyard: l92
[Ul nder international law [a Statel may not go so far as to prevent a ship which is in
distress and requires repairs from entering territorial and coastal waters and seeking
safety in a port or elsewhere along the coast. In such case, the seriousness of the
situation in which the ship finds itself should be weighed against the threat which the
ship poses to the coastal State.

Thus, the right to seek refuge does not extend to situations in which greater damage or loss of Hfe may result were the vessel to enter. The port State must balance
the emergency on the vessel with the threat to its own people and nation. Given the
national security sensitivities in the world today, it seems unlikely that any vessel in
distress today can demand entty to any port at any time. Instead, port State authorities may well conclude, based on all the relevant factors, that permitting a vessel
entry into its port or internal waters represents an unacceptable threat to vital port
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State interests, and take all necessary action to bar entry. However, the doctrine of

force majeure continues to represent a viable basis for requesting such access and, in
most cases, fully expecting to find safe refuge. Moreover, if port State authorities
deny or condition entry, they should be able to articulate a defensible basis for doing so. Finally, if the port State denies entry, that State's authorities, and the masters of any vessels in a position to assist, must provide appropriate aid to preselVe
the lives of any mariners or other persons in distress. m

V. Domestic A uthority and Practical Procedures for Denying Port Entry
Even if a port State has the international legal right to deny entry to its ports to a
particular vessel in the interests of maritime security, the cognizant officials must
usually have explicit domestic authority to do so. While a country's head of State or
legislative body could fonnally advise another State that vessels flying its flag are
not welcome within its ports (such as Japan and Australia have recently done with
respect to vessels flying the North Korean flag and the international community is
doing to enforce UN sanctions against Iran), most decisions are made by lowerlevel functionaries seeking to apply domestic law designed to promote the interests
of the State. Since there is a general presumption of entry for foreign-flag commercial vessels, an official who determines that a vessel may not enter under certain circumstances must generally have the domestic legal authority to do so. Otherwise,
that official and his agency may experience legal and political complications for engaging in an ultra vires act or failing to follow mandated procedures. This might
even result in a lawsuit and/or political or diplomatic pressures if the responsible
official has taken unauthorized or illegal action to the detriment of the fore ign-flag
shipping company and the domestic interests using that vessel to engage in international trade. In other words, even if a State has the international legal right to
prevent entry, the exercise of that right must be carried out in accordance with domestic legal authority and following established procedures.
In the handful of reported decisions that have focused on the denial of port entry in the United States, the aggrieved party has generally taken the position that
the officials who have made the decision to do so have acted contrary to domestic
law and policy. In Canadian Transport Co. v. United States, for example, a Canadian
corporation brought an action for damages for the Coast Guard's refusal to permit
a vessel employing a Polish master and several Polish officers entry to the harbor in
Norfolk, Virginia. 194 The appellate court obselVed that "if the Coast Guard officers
acted arbitrarily and in violation of regulations in diverting [the foreign merchant
vessel], the United States is not immune from a damage action ... ."19S
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In a more recent case, Humane Society ofthe United States v. Clinton,l96 plaintiffs
successfully sued President Clinton and the Secretary of Commerce because of the
federal government's failure to take timely action to sanction Italian driftnet fishing vessels when these government officials had, or should have had, reasonable
cause to believe that such vessels persisted in employing excessively long driftnets
in violation of an international treaty and the implementing statute,l9"7 The US
Court of International Trade concluded that "nine confirmed sightings [of illegal
driftnet fishing by Italian vessels] combined with the numerous allegations make
the Secretary's refusal to identify Italy a second time arbitrary, capricious and not
in accordance with the Driftnet Act."198
Existing federal statutes and regulations give the Coast Guard rather broad
power to deny port entry and control operations within US waters offoreign-flag
vessels found to be in violation oflaws, regulations or treaties to which the United
States is a party. The Ports and Waterways Safety Act of 1972, as amended,l99 specifically authorizes the Secretary of Homeland Security (delegated to the cognizant
Coast Guard District Commander and COTP) to deny port entry to any US port or
navigable waters if"he has reasonable cause to believe such vessel does not comply
with any regulation issued under this chapter or any other applicable law or
treaty."200 Implementing regulations provide that "[e]ach District Commander or
Captain of the Port . .. may deny entry into the navigable waters of the United
States ... to any vessel not in compliance with the provisions of the [Act ] or the regulations issued thereunder."201 Later in that regulation, the District Commander
or COTP is given authority to order a vessel to operate in a particular manner
whenever he "has reasonable cause to believe that the vessel is not in compliance
with any regulation, law or treaty . ... "202
When a port State has good cause to deny port entry to a foreign- flag vessel and
decides to do so, it has an obligation to notify the vessel's master, its flag State and
its owner(s) in as timely a manner as is reasonable under the circumstances. The
President, Secretary of State, appropriate US ambassador or other authorized State
Department official could communicate to the appropriate flag State that a particular vessel may not call upon ports in the United States because of its violation of an
international convention or domestic law. However, under existing US procedures, appropriate Coast Guard officials normally carry out the process of denying
port entry to a fo reign-flag vessel where US laws and regulations require or authorize it. The cognizant District Commander or COTP normally issues an order to
the vessel denying port entry. Such an order should include a summary of the factual sit uation, the basis for denying port entry, the legal authority for taking such
action, the circumstances under which the order would be rescinded, the potential
penalties for violating the order, the process fo r appealing the order and the office
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which the recipient of the order could call for any questions. Such an order should
be communicated not only to the vessel in question, but also to its owners, agents
and fl ag State.
Anytime that the United States seeks to deny port entry to a foreign-flag vessel,
even to a foreign warship, fishing vessel or merchant vessel that is in dear violation
of a law, regulation or treaty obligation, it must find the authority for denying such
entry and comply with basic due process requirements of notice and an opportunity to be heard. Particularly involving issues related to homeland security, the
Coast Guard and other cognizant agencies employ the Maritime Operational
Threat Response (MOTR) coordination process to effectively align and integrate
"responses to real or potential terrorist incidents across all stakeholders" in the federal government. 203 If Congress and cognizant agencies consider that denial of port
entry to certain foreign-flag vessels under particular circumstances promotes key
interests of the United States, there should be laws, regulations and procedures in
place to carry out such a policy. Otherwise there are likely to be legal, political and
practical consequences for the denial.
VI. Evaluation and Development of an Analytical Matrix

One of the key purposes of this paper is to develop a methodology to evaluate proposed and actual conditions that the United States and other port States seek to impose on foreign-flag vessels to promote maritime security. This section will
evaluate both the legal and policy factors that affect the imposition of such conditions and then propose an analytical methodology in determining whether a particular condition on port entry is an appropriate way to promote a particular policy
goal. The final part of this section will emphasize the need and importance ofh armonizing port State regulations with international expectations and procedures.
A. Evaluating Legality and Policy for Imposing Port Entry Conditions
As discussed in detail above, international law permits port States to impose reasonable conditions on the entry of foreign vessels into ports. Promoting maritime security is dearly a reasonable, if not essential, policy goal. However, the
international community presumes that, as a general rule, commercial vessels will
have access to the ports into which they need to enter to engage in global trade. To
be consistent with international law, any conditions on port entry must be based
on important national goals, must be directly and effectively related to accomplishing one or more of these goals and must be objectively prudent and necessary under all the circumstances. Any effort to impose conditions on port entry of a
foreign-flag vessel involves a claim of jurisdiction over the vessel for certain
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purposes. A port State may not deny entry or exercise jurisdiction with respect to a
foreign -flag vessel or its activity when the exercise of such jurisdiction would be arbitrary. discriminatory. unreasonable. in violation of treaty obligations or otherwise
improper. 2Cl4
B. Determina tio n of " Reasonableness"
Although individual States. the international community and legal commentators may
often differ as to when the imposition of conditions or the exercise of jurisdiction is
reasonable under various circwnstances. it is important to make an effort to dctennine
whether the imposition of such restrictions would be reasonable. In detennining
whether the exercise of jurisdiction over a vessel or its activity as a condition of port entry is appropriate or not involves consideration of a number of relevant factors. Questions that a port State and the international community might appropriately ask in
determining the reasonableness of a law or regulation conditioning port entry or imposing jurisdiction upon a vessel's arrival in port include:
(1) Is the policy interest(s) that the law or regulation is designed to add ress
one of significan t importance to the port State?
(2) Does the harm(s) to be avoided. or the benefit(s) to be achieved. have a
direct connection to the fore ign vessel's presence while operating in the
coastal waters of the port State?
(3) Does the regulated activity have a close geographical and temporal nexus
to the entry of the vessel into the waters of the port State?
(4) Will the law or regulation be effective in accomplishing the policy goal(s)
for which it was implemented ?
(5) Would the exercise of jurisdiction under the circumstances violate an
applicable bilateral or multilateral convention or the relevant provisions
of customary international law?
(6) Will the law or regulation have the practicaJ effect of denying or
impeding freedom of navigation in international waters. or the exercise
of the rights of innocent passage. transit passage and archipelagic sea
lanes passage. as provided in the 1982 LOS Convention?
(7) Is there domestic legal authority for denying port en try, and have the
appropriate authorities complied with the procedural requirements to
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notify the vessel of the denial and included an opportunity to be heard on
the matter?
(8) Is there a less intrusive, disruptive, expensive, complicated or
objectionable way to accomplish the same policy goal(s)?
Each of these questions is relevant in determining the reasonableness of the law or
regulation under consideration. States considering whether or not to enact such
laws or impose such regulations should evaluate them to ensure they are objectively reasonable.
C. Harmonizing Regulations with International Law and Expectations
Even where the port State can demonstrate that the proposed regulation is important and that, under the factors discussed above, it is objectively reasonable, it is
important to harmonize the proposed regulation with relevant international standards and expectations. The best way to accomplish this is to obtain the approval of
the "competent international organization" charged with regulating the particular
activity. If a port State wanted to establish a traffic separation scheme for vessels engaged in innocent passage through its territorial sea on the way into internal waters, international law requires that it take into account "the recommendations of
the competent international organization. "205 Before establishing such schemes
within international straits used for international navigation, the 1982 LOS Convention requires that the "States bordering the straits shall refer proposals to the
competent international organization with a view to their adoption. "206 Within the
exclusive economic zone, a coastal State may "adopt laws and regulations for the
prevention, reduction and control of pollution from vessels conforming to and
giving effect to generally accepted international rules and standards .... "207 Based
on comity and efficiency, all States should seek to harmonize their national expectations, standards and procedures with those of the international community.
The 1982 LOS Convention provides for coordinating proposals that affect international shipping, particularly with respect to navigational safety and the protection of the marine environment, within the IMO process. The IMO has proven
particularly adept at reaching consensus, and then harmonizing national and international standards and expectations for a wide variety of issues ranging from
vessel construction through bilge-water-discharge standards. The 1965 Convention on Facilitation of International Maritime Traffic, which the IMO has updated
regularly, emphasizes the importance of simplifying and reducing to a minimum
the administrative burdens imposed on international shipping "to facilitate and
expedite international maritime traffic .... "2(18
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Any measures designed to protect port State interest must also be instituted in
such a way so as to avoid the practical effect of denying or impeding freedom of
navigation as provided in the 1982 LOS Convention. Those interested in the law of
the sea m ust be concerned about the potential impact that restrictions on port entry might have on vessels merely engaged in transit passage, innocent passage or
high seas navigation in the exclusive economic zone of another State. Some of the
restrictions on port entry under consideration by some port States, such as Australia's recent decision to require pilots on most vessels transiting the Torres Strait,
threaten traditional navigational freedoms and undermine long-standing principles of the law of the sea. 209 Others are less objectionable, because they bind only
State parties. These include a provision of the recently adopted Wreck Removal
Convention, which imposes a requirement that each State party shall ensure that
any ship entering or leaving a port or offshore terminal provide evidence of financial security.2l0 Another trend in multilateral treaties is to require that States party
bar entry to their ports for fishing vessels determined to have been engaged in illegal, unregulated and unreported fishing activities. Another issue that requires consideration is the possible impact of conditions on entry with trade agreements.
Since World War II, multilateral efforts have sought to reduce barriers to international trade, while ensuring a level playing field. These efforts first resulted in the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). During the 1990s, negotiations
led to the establishment of the World Trade Organization (WTO ), which took over
most of the functions ofGATI. Although the WTO/GATT process is silent on the
specific issue of vessel access to ports, the denial of a right of port entry could well
be seen as a trade barrier inconsistent with a nation's responsibility under its provisions. Moreover, if a port State were to treat vessels flying various foreign flags differently, the wrO/GATI rules may apply to prevent discrimination or favorab le
treatment being given to vessels from member States. 211 However, in practice,
there is little real danger of a successful challenge when the port State is seeking to
promote legitimate concerns, such as environmental protection, vessel safety and
homeland security. As Professor Ted Dorman put it,
While the international trade agreements administered by the W.T.O. may affect the
ability of a port state to deny access to foreign vessels or to impose burdensome
conditions on foreign vessels entering port, the effect is limited to those situations
where the port state is using port access as a means to deny entry of the goods being
212
carried by the vessel.
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As discussed earlier in this article, any regulations designed to restrict entry to US
ports must also be consistent with our international obligations under any bilateral
FeN treaties to which the US is party.

VII. Recommendations and Conclusion
For the good of the entire world community, policymakers must seek to ensure
that ocean trade contin ues to flourish and grow. This requires promoting access to
key ports with minimal restrictions and conditions. Toward this end, international
law presumes that the ports of every port State should be open to all foreign commercial vessels, and a port may be closed or a vessel denied entry to the port only
when important interests of the port State justify the closure.
At the same time, the world community must be sensitive to the legitimate concerns of port States to protect important national interests, particu1arly maritime
safety and security. To promote and protect these and other important interests,
port States have a right to close their ports or to impose conditions on port entry
and exit with respect to a broad range of important interests directly related to the
vessel's visit. A port State may restrict entry to all foreign vessels, subject only to any
rights of entry clearly granted under an applicable treaty and those vessels in distress due to force majeure.
To avoid using international trade as a heavy-handed and ineffective diplomatic
tool designed to reward or punish foreign States, however, a port State should not
impose port entry or exit requirements on foreign merchant vessels--or exercise jurisdiction on foreign-flag vessels in port--even those designed to promote important goals, that are not reasonably related to the visit of the vessel in question on the
specific occasion. Toward this end, absent specific, identifiable concerns with respect to the vessel or State in question, a port State shou1d treat all foreign-flag vessels equally, and not discriminate in the prescription and enforcement of its laws.
The application of the law of the port State should not have the practical effect of
denying or impairing the traditional rights of the sea, including freedom of navigation in international waters, or the exercise of the rights of innocent passage, transit
passage and archipelagic sea lanes passage, in coastal waters. Moreover, denial of
port entry, or imposing unreasonable conditions on port entry, has an adverse impact on the port State's ability to engage in international trade. As a result, such restrictions harm the economy of both the port State and, to a less direct extent, the
world community at large.
Given the crucial importance of international trade in today's global economy,
incremental costs, short delays or minor disruptions can have a profoundly adverse
impact. In this regard, harmonizing and coordinating conditions on port entry
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throughout the world community, with similar expectations, requirements, forms
and procedures, can achieve the goals without imposing as much of an administrative burden . Wisely balancing the benefits to be achieved from imposing conditions on port entry, such as intelligently devised security requirements, against the
costs and burdens associated with each, is essential. International lawyers and policymakers m ust strive to ensure that access to the world's ports is as free as reasonably possible, and that conditions on entry and exit are directly and effectively
related to the important interests of the port State and the world community at
large. The goal of all States should be to promote and ensure safe, secure, efficient
and environmentally sound international ocean trade.
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nations accords an unrestricted right of access to harbors by vessels of aU nations." Khedivial
Line, S.A.E. v. Seafarers' In!'1 Union, 278 F.2d 49, 52 (2d Cir. 1960). " In any event, the lawofnations would not require more than comity to the ships of a foreign nation" and in the specific
context the Court addressed it noted that American vessels were harassed in the ports of the
United Arab Republic. ld.
19. For a good example of one State's approach, see the 1995 Norwegian Regulations Governing Pilotage and Entry to Norwegian Waters (June 20, 1995), available at http://
www.state.gov/www/globaUoes/oceansfntrvoI13.htmL
20. CHURCHILL & LoWE, supra note 7, at 107 (footnote omitted).
21. "In the case of warships, the assertion of comprehensive authority to exclude most frequently takes the form of establishing limiting conditions for entry, with particular emphasis
upon the necessity for giving notice of intended visits." MCDoUGAL & BURKE, supra note 1, at
94. See also id. at 114-15.
22. ~IT]he right lof port States] to exclude foreign warships is undoubted." CHURCHIll &
LOWE, supra note 7, at 61. See also LoUIS B. SOHN &JOHN E. NOYES, CASES AND MATERIALS ON
THE u..W OF THE SEA 377-78 (2004) (treaties offriendship, commerce and navigation usually do
not provide for warship access).
23. See, e.g., Straddling and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks Agreemen t art. 23, Dec. 4, 1995.34
INTERNATIONAL LEGAL MATERIALS 1542, 1567 ( 1995) (" Measures taken by a port State").
24. The general practice of the free access of merchant ships of almost all nations
to almost all commercial ports is based upon convenience and economic
interest, and in the absence of treaty provisions, it is not based upon any sense
of legal obligation .. . . [A] coastal state can impose special regul ations with
regard 10 fIshing boats and privately owned pleasure and racing yachts and
boats. For this reason, they form separate categories.
V.D. Degan, InterlUll Waters, 17 NETHERLANDS YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL u..W 3 (1986).
25. For example, in 1985 New Zealand announced that it would not permit nuclear-capable
US warships to enter its ports absent an official statement confirming that no such weapons wrre
on board. See STUART MCMIlL\N, NEITHER CONFIRM NOR DENY: THE NUClEAR SHIPS DISPUTE BETWEEN NEW ZEALAND AND THE UNITED STATES ( 1987).
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26. ~There is a presumption that ports traditionally designated for foreign trade are open to
all ships and that the arbitrary closure of a port gives rise to a right of protest and, under certain
circumstances, liability for damages." Ademuni-Odeke, Port State Control and UK Law, 28 JOUR·
NAL OF MARlTIME LAw AND COMMERCE 657, 660 (1997) (footno te omitted).
27. CHURCHILL & LoWE, supra note 7, at 63.
28. HA coastal state can condition the entry of foreign ships into its ports on compliance with
(its ] laws and regulations." RFSTATEMENT, supra note 2, § 512 rep. n. 3.
29. See International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea, Nov. I, 1974,32 U.S.T. 47,
1184 U.N.T.s. 276, Xl-2, Reg. 9/2.1.6 (hereinafter SOLAS Convention]; International Ship and
Port Facility Security (ISPS) Code, Part B 4.39. For details on the current status of the SOLAS
Convention and its amendments, see http://www.imo.orgfConventionslcontents.asp?topic
_id=257&doCid=647. See also Ports and Waterways Safety Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-474, § 2,
92 Stat. 1472 (codified at 33 US Code § 1223(a)(5) and implemented by 33 C.F.R. § 160.201 et

seq).
30. An FCN treaty usually p rovides guaranlees for the access of foreign vessels to ports and
their subsequent departu res. See, e.g., Treaty of Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation, US·
Italy, arts. XlX(3) and XX( I), Feb. 2, 1948, 63 Stat. 2256, 2284. Even then, howeve r, FCN treaties
do not preclude a port State from denying access to vessels flying the flag of the other State party
to protect essential interests. McDOUGAL & BURKE, supra note I, at 109. The provisions of most
FCN treaties provide for restricting access when Hnecessary for the protection of the essential in·
terests . .. in time of national emergency. ~ TreatyofFriendship, Commerce and Navigation, USJapan, art. XXI, Ap r. 2, 1953, 4 U.S.T. 2063.
31. Professors Churchill and Lowe opined that the power to condition access could be lim·
ited. CHURCHILL & LOWE, supra note 7, at 63. See also Ademu ni-Odeke, supra note 26, at 660
(K[T]he arbitrary clos ure of a port gives rise to a righ t of protest and, under certain circum·
stances, liability for damages. ~).
32. The nonnal practice in these FCN agreements is to exclude fishing vessels and warships
from the port access provisions, except incases of distress. MCDoUGAL & BURKE, supra note I, at
109-10 & n.59.
33. CHURCHILL & LOWE, supra note 7, at 65, 98-99. See The Schooner Exc hange v.
McFaddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116, 147 (1812) (K]A] public anned ship, in the service of a for·
eign sovereign, .. . should be exempt from the jurisdiction of the co untry."). See also 1982 LOS
Convention, supra note 8, arts. 30-33, 95-96.
34. See RFSTATEMENT, supra note 2, § 457, rep. n. 7, and § 512, rep. n. 6; CHURCHILL &
LOWE, supra note 7, at 99 ("[T] he flag State is responsible for loss to the coastal State . . . . "). See
also 1982 LOS Convention, supra note 8, arts. 30-33 and 42(5).
35. London Convention on the Facilitation of International Maritime Traffic art. 1, Apr. 9,
1965,18 U.s.T. 411, 591 U.N.T.S. 265 [hereinafter FAL Convention] . See Jochen Erler, The New
Convention on Facilitation ofInternational Maritime Traffic, 13 MCGILL LAW JOURNAL 323, 32328 ( 1967). Cf 1982 LOS Convention, supra note 8, art. 255 (KStates shall adopt reasonable rules,
regulations and procedures to promote and facilitate marine scientific research [including], sub·
ject 10 the provisions of their laws and regulations, access to their harbo urs . ... ~) .
36. See FAL Convention, supra no te 35, art. 16. See also COLOMBOS, supra note 4, § 181,
at 177. KThe entry of foreign merchant ships may thus be reasonably regula ted prov ided no
hindrance is put in the way of international trade and no discrimina tion made between States so
as to favo ur some at the expense of others.» Jd. 1n lerestingiy, the 1982 LOS Convention does no t
specifically provide for an equal-treatment port·access regime, except in the limiled circum·
stances of land-locked States. "Ships flying the flag of land-locked States shall enjoy treatmen t
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equal to that accorded to other foreign ships in maritime ports. ~ 1982 LOS Convention, supra
note 8, art. 131.
37. Stephen E. F1ynn,America the Vulnerable, 81 FoREIGN AFFAIRS, Jan.-Feb. 2002,at 60, 66.
38. Quoted in April Terreri, International Trade is Less Secure Than You Think, WORLD
TRADE MAGAZINE, Sept. 4, 2006, available at http://www.worldtrademag.com/CDAlArtidesl
Fealure_Artide/d37c594 7e()c7dO 1OVgn VCM I OOOOO~32a8cO.
39. See J.M. ROBERTS, HISTORY Of THE WORLD 73-99, 333-34, 441-505 (1993). See also
A Century of Free Trade, BOC NEWS, Feb. 12,2003, http://news.blx.co.ukJ l/hilbusinessJ533716
.sm.
40. International Trade, ENCYCLOPf.DIA BRITANNICA ONLINE (2007), http://www.britannica
.com/eb/artide-9106321/international-trade.
41. Andrew Marshall, Waterway to the World, TIME ASIA MAGAZINE, July 25, 2006, available
at http://www.time.com/time/asia/2006/journey/strai t.htmL
42. US DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY, SECURE SEAS, OPEN PORTS: KEEPING OUR
WATERS SAfE, SECURE, AND OPEN fOR BUSINfSS 3 (2004), available at http://www
.piersystem.comlpostedl586/DHSPortSecurityFactSheet_0621 04.4 1841. pdf.
43. John D. Haveman, Howard J. Shatz & Emesto A. Vilchis, U.S. Port Security Policy after 9/11:
Overview and EvallUltion, 2 JOURNAL Of HOMELAND SECURITY & EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT 1
(2005), amilableat http://www.bepress.comljhsemlvo12/iss4/1. "Multimodal~ means the ability
to transfer shipping containers quickly to and from ocean vessels and other transportation modalities, such as rail cars, trucks, barges and airplanes.
44. OffiCE Of STATISTICAL & ECONOMIC ANALYSIS, MARITIME ADMINISTRATION, US DEPARTMENT Of TRANSPORTATION, VF.SSEL CALLS AT U.S. PORTS (2004), ix-x, 16-20 (July 2005),
available at http://www.marad.dot.gov/Marad_Statisticslvcalls2004.pdf [hereinafter MARAn [.
45. K. Lamar Walters Ill, Industry on Alert: Legal and Economic Ramifications of the Homeland Security Ad on Maritime Commerce, 30 TULANE MARITIME LAw JOURNAL 311, 323-24
(2006).
46. [d. at 323. See also Jeremy Firestone & James Corbett, Maritime Transportation: A Third
Way for Port and Environmental Secu rity, 9 WIDENER LAW SYMPOSIUM JOURNAL 419, 422
(2002-03).
47. Energy lnfonnation Administration, US Department of Energy, Crude Oil and Total Petroleum Imports Top IS Countries, Jan. 17, 2007, http://www.eia.doe.gov/pub/oil...,gaslpetrolewn!
data_publicationslcompany_leveUmports/currentlimport.html. Canada is lhe single nation
providing the largest source of foreign oil 10 the American market. Id.
48. US LNG imports have been growing dramatically in recent years. The primary sources of
LNG for consumption in the United States include Trinidad and Tobago, Algeria and Nigeria.
Energy Infonnation Administration, US Department of Energy, U.s. Natural Gas Imports by
Country, last updated. Jan. 18, 2007, http://tonto.eia.doe.gov/dnav/nglns..move_impc_sl
_m.htm.
49. U.s. COAST GUARD, THE U.S. COAST GUARD STRATEGY fOR MARITIME: SAFETY, SECU·
RITY, AND STEWARDSHIP 18 (2007), available at http://www.uscg.miVcomdtispeeches/docs/
CGS-FinaLpdf. See also Natural Gas Intelligence, North American LNG Import Tenninals, Nov.
6,2006, http://intelligencepress.comlfeaturesllngl.
SO. MARAD, supra note 44. See also Firestone & Corbett, supra note 46, al 422.
51. See Pearl Harbor Attack, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA ONLINE (2007), http://www
.britannica.comleb/article-9058877/Pearl-Harbor -attack.
52. See Michael N. Schmitt, U.S. Secu rity Strategies: A Legal Assessment, 27 HARVARD JOURNALOF LAw &PUBLIC POLICY 737, 738-40 (200J-()4);Steven M. Kosiak, The Cost and Funding
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of the Global War on Terror (GWOT), Jan. 18, 2007, http://www.comw.orglpda/fulltextl
070lkosiak.pdf (testimony before Congress).
53. See MICHAEL E. O'HANLON, PROTECTING THE M1ERlCAN HOMELAND: A PREliMINARY
ANALYSIS 7 (2002) (explaining that not only would such a port-security disaster cause mass cas ualties and destruction, it would require shutting down the US maritime import and export systems, causing maritime gridlock, the economic conapse of many businesses and possible
economic losses totaling $1 trillion).
54. "It is feared that terrorists could use the ubiquitous, anonymous, and largely innocuous
steel boxes and their transport system to devastating effect." MICHAEL D. GREENBERG ET AL,
MARITIME TERRORISM : RISK AND LlABILl1i' 111- 14 (2006) (footnote omiued). See Justin
Menor, Missing the &at: TIle Legal and Practienl Problems of the Prevention of Maritime Terrorism, 18 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW 341, 348-51 (2002--03); Stephen
E. Fl ynn, Homeland Security Is a Coast Guard Mission, US NAVAL INSTITUTE PROCEEDINGS, Oct.
2001, at 72, 72-73.
55. Eben Kaplan, Liquefied Natural Gas: A Potential Terrorist Target?, Feb. 27, 2006, http://
www.cfr.orglp ublication/9810/.SeeaIsoAugustGribbin,SnlpnrtsSeenas Terrorism Target: U.S.
Will Secure Harbors, but Actions Likely to Hurt Trade, WASHINGTON TIMES, Jan. 22, 2002, at AI.
There have been disturbing reports of terrorists hijacking supertankers, practicing handling
them and then stealing man uals on vessel operations before leaving the ship. See Gal Luft & Anne
Korin, Terrorism Goes to Sea, FOREIGN AFFAIRS, Nov.- Dec. 2004, at 61, 68-70.
56. Mellor, supra note 54. See alS(} Paul W . Parfonnak, Liquified Natural Gas (LNG) Infrastructure Security: Issues for Congress, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE REPORT FOR CONGRFSS, 25-26 (2005), available at http://ncseonline.orglnlelcrsreportsl05mar/RL32073.pc!£
57. Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 307 (1981) (quoting Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.s.
500,509(1964».
58. Jonathan Medalia, Terrorist Nue/ear Attacks on Seaport5: Threat and Response, CONGRESSIONAL REsEARCH SERVICE REPORT FOR CONGRESS I, 1-2 (2005); Menor, supra note 54, at 34647 (focusing on the problem of weapons shipped into the Uni ted States in a cargo container); see
Flynn, supra note 37, at 72-73 (the United States has a pressing need to defend against terrorist
attacks at vulnerable seaports ).
59. According to one study, a ten-kiloton weapon detonated in a major seaport would kill as
many as one miDion people and inflict as much as $1.7 triDion dollars in property damage, trade
disruption and indirect costs. CURK C. ABT, ExECtrrlVE SUMMARY: THE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF
NUCLEAR TERRORlST ATIACKS ON FREIGHT TRANSPORT SYSTEMS IN AN AGE OF SEAPORT VUL·
NERABILl1i' 3 (2003), available at http://www.abtassociates.com/reportslES-Economic_lmpact
_of _N uclear_Terrorist_Attacks.pdf.
60. See Section IV infra (~Conditions on Entry Rela ted to National Defense, Homeland
Security, Counterterrorism and law Enforcement Concerns").
61. Convention and Statute on the International Regi me of Maritime Ports art. 3, annexed
to the Convention on the International Rtgime of Maritime Ports, Dec. 9, 1923, 28 L.N.T.S. 115.
The Uni ted States is not party to eith er the Statute or the Convention on the International
RegimeofMaritime Ports. ~[A] l though ratified by only a small number of states, [the 1923 Convention] reflects largely customary rules of international law." BERNAERTS, supra note II, al ili .
62. See, e.g., 46 App. US Code § 91; 46 US Code §§ 42107 and 52305 (2006) (K Refusal of
clearance and entry").
63. 46 App. US Code §§ 121-35. Note that tonnage duty is to be paid based on the displacemen t of the vessel, while the tariff or customs duty is a separate levy based on the value of the imported merchandise.
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64. See, e.g., 8 US Code §§ 1181 ( ~Admission of immigrants into the U.S."), 1281-87 (~Alien
crewmen").
65. See, e.g., 42 US Code §§ 264-72; and 9 C.F.R. § 93.106 ( ~Quarantine requirements'" for
animals and plants being imported in to the United States).
66. Congress has provided statutory authority for controlling infectiou s diseases, including
the q uarantining of suspect vessels and their crews and passengers. 42 US Code §§ 264-72. The
President regularly updates the list of communicable diseases subject to quarantine. Exec. Order
No. 13,295, Apr. 4, 2003, 68 Fed. Reg. 17,255 (Apr. 9, 2003), reprinted in 42 US Code § 264, as
amended by Exec. Order No. 13,375, Apr. 1,2005, 70 Fed. Reg. 17299 (Apr. 5,2005). He has also
delegated to the Secretary of Health and Human Services his authority to carry out d uties under
the statute. ld. See a/so 42 C.P.R. p ts. 71 & 72.
67. See 42 US Code § 267(a): ~ f The Surgeon General] shall from time to time select suitable
sites for and establish such addi tional . . . anchorages in the Slates and possessions of the United
States as in his judgment are necessary to prevent the introduction of communicable diseases
into the States and possessions of the United States." " It shall be the duty of th e customs officers
and of Coast Guard officers to aid in th e enforcement of quarantine rules and regulations . . . . ~ 42
US Code § 268(b ).
68. ~The excl usion of al iens is a fundamenta1 act of sovereignty." Kn auff v. Shaughnessy, 338
U.S. 537, 542-43 ( 1950). In 1981, President Reagan ordered the Coast Guard to in terdict vessels
on the high seas where there was reason to believe the vessel was engaged in the transportation of
illegal immigrants. Exec. Order No. 12,324,46 Fed. Reg. 48,107, 48,109 (Sept. 29, 1981 ). President Bush issued similar guidance in 1992. Exec. Order No. 12,807, 57 Fed. Reg. 23,133 (1992).
This policy remains in effect today. See Gary W. Paimer, Guarding the Coast: A/ien Migrant Interdiction Operatian5 at Sea, 29 CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW 1565, 1569-72 (1997).
69. FAL Convention, supra note 35. The p urpose of the FAL Convention is to facilitate
maritime traffic by sim plifying and reducing to a minimum the formalities, documentary requirements and p rocedures on th e arrival, stay and departu re of ships engaged in international
voyages." Id. (Preamble).
70. See Rosalie Balkin, The Inter/Illtiona/ Maritime Organization and Maritime Security, 30
TuLANE MARlTIME LAw JOURNAL I, 14 (2006) (noting that th e 2002 amendments to the FAL
Convention entered into force on May I, 2003).
71. Information concerning IMO-recommended practices and fonns for the FALConvention is available al http://www.imo.orglConventionsJcon tents.asp?lopiC id= 259&doc_id =
684#4.
72. MCDOUGAL & BURKE, supra note I, at 96 (footnote omitted). See a/Si) HAI)lANG YANG,
jURl$DlCflON OF THE COASTAL STATE OVER POREIGN MERCHANT SHIPS IN INTERNAL WATERS
AND THE TERRITORIAL SEA 208-20 (2006).
73. 46 US Code §§ 8501- 503. Compulsory pilotage requirements in internal wa ters are
among the accepted rights of a port State. Glen Plant, International Lega/ Aspects of Vessel Traffic
Services, 14 MARINE POUCY 71, 73 (1990).
74. ~Except as otherwise provided in this subtitle, p ilots in the bays, rivers, harbors, and ports
of the United States shall be regulated only in confonnity with the laws of the States" 46 USCode §
8501 (a). Altho ugh the Constitution dearly gives Congress the power to reguJate commerce with
foreign nations, including reguJating pilotage, Congresscontinues to let the individual States regulate mOSI pilotage matters. See Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 535 U.S. 151, 159--60 (1978) (States
may not impose pilotage requirements on ~enrolled vessels" covered by fede ral laws, but Kit is
equal ly clear that they are freeto impose pilotage requirements on registered vessels en tering and
leaving their ports .. . . ~) . But.see 46 US Code §§ 9301-308 (a federal regulatory scheme governs
K
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pilotage on the Great Lakes), and 46 US Code § 8502 (req uiring federally licensed pilots for vessels designa ted therein)_
75_ JEANETTE GREENFIELD, CHINA'S PRACfICES IN THE LAW OF THE SEA 32-33 (1992).
Since 1979, th e People's Republic of China has established an extensive set of regulations on port
access both for security purposes and to foster international trade. Mark A. Hamilton, Negoti-

ating Port Access: The Sino-U.S. Opportunity for Leadership in the Maritime Transport Services Industry, 3 ASIAN-PACIFIC LAw & POLICY JOURNAL 153, 155-56 (2002). Par example, a vessel must
req uest permission at least one week before the visit, must com ply with a host of conditions on
port access, must use the services of a p ilot and must pay various port fees for services and customs. Failure to do so can result in denial of access, fines or even detention. GREENFIELD, supra at
31-34.
76. In the United States, the Ports and Waterways Safety Act provides auth ority for the Secretary of H omeland Security to establish a comprehensive program for vessel traffic services in
US ports. 33 US Code §§ 1221-32. This includes provision for civil and criminal penalties, and
authorizes the Captain of the Port to deny entry or withhold clearance to depart for vessels that
fail 10 comply. Jd. at § 1232. See also 33 C.P.R. § 160.1-160.111.
77. A total of some fourt een tho usand vessels transit th e Panama Canal each year, carrying
over 203 million tons in cargo. See Panama Canal, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA ONLINE (2007),
http://www.britannica.comleb/article-911 0730/Panama -Canal.
78. See Houston Ship Channel, WI KIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia. orglwikiiHouston
_Ship_Channel (last visited Dec. 28, 2007).
79. See 33 US Code § 1223 ("Vessel operating requirements"); 33 C.F.R. §§ 164.11 ("Navigation underway: general ~), 164.13 ("Navigation underway: tankers").
80. The Transportation Safety Act of 1974 is the statutory framework for such regulations.
49 US Code §§ 5101-27. See 49 c.P.R. pt. 176 ("This part prescribes requirements . . . 10 be observed wi th respect to the transportation of hazardous materials by vesseL~)
81. See 33 US Code § 1228 ("Conditions for entry to ports in the United Stales"). Seealso RE·
STATEMENT supra note 2, § 512 emt. c, rep. n.4.
82. See 33 US Code § 1228(a)( I ).
83. 1982 WS Convention, supra note 8, arl. 219 (the vessel will proceed for repairs before
being permitted to leave) .
84. See Sean Poltrack, Maritime Industry and the Environment: The De/icate Ba/aTJCe of Economic and Environmental Concerns, 8 UNIVERSI1i' OF BALTIMORE JOURNAL OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAw 51,74-75 (2001--02) ("Vessel Safety Management").
85. SOLAS Convention, supra note 29.
86. Titanic, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA ONLINE (2007), http://www.britannica.com/eb/
article-9072642{filanic.
87. SOLAS Convention, supra note 29, ch.l, reg. 19(c) & ch. XI, reg. 4.
88. International Convention on Standards of Training, Certification and Watchkeepingfor
Seafarers, with Annex (STCW), July 7,1978, S. Exec. Doc. EE 96-1, C.T.LA. No. 7624, 1361
U.N.T.S. 19O.
89. See http://www.imo.orglConventionslcontents.asp?doc_id=651&topic_id=257 (providing details on the current stalUS of the STCW Convention) .
90. See 33 US Code § 1228 ("Conditions for entry to ports in th e United Stales").
n
91. 33 C.F.R. pt. 164 ("Navigational safety regulations ) . See, e.g., th e proposal by the European Union to bar entry to its ports 10 ships that fail to comply with the SOLAS International
Safety Management Code, which has since been incorporated into Chapter IX of SOLAS.
92. SeeCOLOMBOS, supra note 4, § 181, at 177:
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[Elach State has the right to enact laws controlling navigation within its national wateu.
The entry of foreign merchant ships may thus be reasonably regulated provided no
hindrance is put in the way of international trade and no discrimination made between
States so as to favour some at the expense of others.
ld.
93. 46 US Code § 70114; 33 C.F.R. § 164.46 (U Automatic identification system~) . AIS is defined as
a maritime navigation safety communications system standardized by the International
Telecommunication Union (ITU) and adopted by the International Maritime
Organization (IMO) that provides vessel information, including the vessel's identity,
type, position, course, speed, navigational status and other safety-related information
automatically to ap propriately equipped shore stations, other ships, and aircraft;
receives automatically such information from similarly fitted ships; monitors and
tracks ships; and exchanges data with shore-based facilities.
47 C.F.R. § 80.5.
94. J.M. Sollosi, The Automated Idfmtifirntion System 6- Port Security, PROCEEDINGS Of THE
MARINE SAfETY COUNCIL, Apr.-May 2003, at 36, available at http://www.uscg.miVhq/g-m/
nmclpubs/proceedlnewpromagpage2oo5/q2_03.pdf.
95. Brian Tetreault, Automated Identifirntion System: The Use of AlS in Support of Maritime
Domain Awareness, US COAST GUARD PROCEEDINGS, Fall 2006, at 27, 2S-30.
96. Sollosi, supra note 94, at 38. uThe AlS wo uld contribute to this IMaritime Domain
Awarenessl mission by enabling the shore authority to track certain suspect vessels." See also
Alexandra Marks, Amerirn's Ship-Tracking Challenge, CHRlSTlAN SCIENCE MONITOR, Jan. 31,
2007, at 3, available at http://www.csmonitor.coml2oo7/0131/p03s03- usgn.html.
97. 33 C.F.R. § 164.41 ("" Electronic position fixing devices"). The widespread availability of
inexpensive and highly accurate Global Positioning System receivers, computers and communications systems linked to these devices should help make collisions and groundings a thingofthe
past.
98. 33 C.F.R. § 164.38 (U Automatic radar plotting aids (ARPA)"); see id., app. B.
99. 46 C.F.R. § 184.502 (vessels required to comply with Federal Communications
Commission requirements).
100. 33 C.F.R. § 160.212. After 9/11, the Coast Guard immediately acted to increase the advance NOA requirement from twenty-four to ninety-six hours. Temporary Requirements for
Notification of Arrival in U.S. Ports, 66 Fed. Reg. 50,565, 50,566-68 (Oct. 4, 2001) (Chart 1Time for Submission) (codified at 33 C.F.R. pt. 160).
101. 33 C. F.R. at § 160.206 (Table 160.2(6). See J. Ashley Roach, Con tainer and Port Security: A Bilateral Perspective, 181NTERNATlONAL JOURNAL Of MARINE & COASTAL LAw 341, 35557 (2003) (U Advance Notice of Arrival").
102. 33 C.F.R. § 160.206 (Table 160.206). The ISPS Code is a comprehensive set of measures
that the IMO adop ted in response to the threats to ships and port facilities in the wake of the 9/11
attacks on the United States. The ISPS Code requires ships and ports to develop and implement
an approved security plan to prevent, among other things, terrorists h iring on as crew members
and smuggling weapons, explosives and other such contraband in to target ports. MTSA-ISPS Infonnation Site, http://www.uscg.miVhq/g-mlmp/mtsa.shtml.
103. 33 C.F.R. § 160.215. See also 46 C.F.R. subpt. 4-05 (notice requirement in case ofa marine casualty).
104. See 33 USCode § 1228 ("Conditions for entry to ports in the United States"); 33 C.F.R. §
160.107 (HDenial of entry'").
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105. See Hartmul G. Hesse, Maritime Security in a Multilateral Context: IMO ActiYiti~ to Enhance Maritime Security, 18 1NTERNATIONAl JOURNAL OF MARINE & COASTAL LAW 327, 332-33
(2003).
106. MCDoUGAL & BURKE, supra note I, a194, 100-101, 114.
107. Id. at 102-103. Seealso Access to, or Anchorage in, the Port of Danzig, of Polish War Ves·
sels, 1931 P.CI.). (ser. A) No. 43, ill'ailable at http://www.worldcourts.comlpcij/engldecisionsl
1931.12. II_danzigl.
108. See, e.g., TreatyofFriendship, Commerce, and Naviga tion, US-Japan, art. XlX(7),supra
note 30.
109. 1923 Convention and Statu le on the International RfgimeofMaritime Ports, supra note
61, art.13.
110. MCDOUGAL & BURKE, supra note I, at 100-103. "The coastal state ought to be accorded
relatively complele discretion in deciding upon th e permissibility of the entry of [warships into
portJ .n ld. al 100.
III. "Before a warship enters a foreign port, it is generally required th at her State or the naval
officer in command should notify in advance the terri torial State of her proposed visit. The num·
ber of warships belonging to the same Power which may remain at the same time in a foreign port
and also the period of th eir stay is usually regulated by the territorial State. ~ COLOMBOS. supra note
4, § 274, at 262.
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